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LONG-RUN BALANCING OF THE BUDGET

BY PROFESSOR GUSTAV CASSEL

During the economic crisis it was found in almost every country that the national expenditure was rising to such a level that, even with a greatly increased taxation, it was impossible to cover it with revenue. The view gained ground that drastic retrenchment might aggravate the economic depression, and that similar results might ensue from an inordinate increase in the burden of taxation. The conclusion drawn from these reflections was that in particularly bad years the Government should be free to have recourse to borrowing even for covering current expenditure, or to consume previously accumulated funds, if available. In other words, people became convinced that in bad years it should be permissible for the budget to be *underbalanced*. The implication is an *overbalancing* of the budget in good years. The revenue side of the budget should then show a surplus which could be used either to cover deficits which had accumulated during the depression or to lay up reserves for a coming slump. A State like Sweden which annually made large remunerative investments of capital covered by loans might accumulate such reserves by reducing their borrowing and, instead, draw on the budget surplus for such investments.

The result of this financial policy should be the maintenance of equilibrium in the national finances for a sequence of years. The traditional insistence on equilibrium in the budget of each separate year is abandoned and deliberately replaced by the demand for a long-run balancing of the budget. The length of the period allowed for the restoration of equilibrium in the national finances is a matter which can scarcely be determined by laying down any fixed rules. It must suffice for Governments and parliaments always to bear in mind that the new financial policy aims at a regulation of the budget during a trade cycle, comprising periods of prosperity and depression.

A budget reform on these lines had been prepared in Sweden for several years, and in 1937 a Bill in which the principles of the new arrangement of the budget were laid down was passed by the Riksdag. The budget which was introduced at the beginning of the 1938 session of the Riksdag, and is applicable to the financial year 1st July 1938—30th June 1939, is drawn up on the principles thus laid down. An elucidation of the leading features in the new budget should therefore be of interest to readers both in Sweden and abroad.

On the face of it, the new budgetary policy manifests itself in the establishment of a special State fund, "the budget regulation fund". If a budget is "overbalanced", this signifies that it is expected to make a contribution to the budget regulation fund, to which, on the other hand, recourse will be had in order to restore equilibrium in the underbalanced budgets of a period of depression. It is thus supposed that the budget regulation fund will show now a positive, now a negative, balance.

Such a method of balancing the budget obviously involves the necessity of strictly discriminating between the current expenditure of the State and its expenditure on capital account. So far as State investments of capital are for remunerative purposes, the Government should have recourse to borrowing. But certain expenditure on capital account is remunerative only in part, or may yield no profit at all. In accordance with the Swedish budgetary system such expenditure should be covered by revenue. For that purpose the budget is divided into two sections, a current budget and a capital budget. The capital budget includes all appropriations on capital account, whilst the current budget makes

a contribution to the capital budget corresponding to the expenditure which should be immediately written off as unremunerative. This arrangement serves to show quite clearly how the budget is really balanced.

In looking for some indication as to whether the budget is balanced on a long-run view, the maintenance of the State's capital after the lapse of several years may be regarded as a good criterion. Changes in this capital for the better or for the worse are, it is thought, permissible for particular years, but for the whole cycle they should balance one another. According to this view, the capital of the State will serve, so to speak, as a dialplate: the maintenance of that capital unchanged will show that the intended balancing of the budget on a long-run view has actually been carried into effect. In itself, however, it is of no great interest that the capital of the State should be maintained at a constant level. Should it happen, for example owing to technical developments, that some part of the capital invested by the State becomes unremunerative and therefore valueless, it is not at all necessary, and perhaps not at all desirable, that the State property should be restored to its quondam value by an inordinate increase in the rate of taxation. We do indeed find that the maintenance of the value of the State property is sometimes regarded as an end in itself. In this connection, however, it is of fundamental importance to make it clear that this is something entirely different from an interest in the long-run balancing of the budget.

It is of special importance to bear this in mind at the outset of the new financial policy. For, if the maintenance of the State property is to be taken as a criterion of the long-run balancing of the budget, we must proceed from a certain valuation of that property. In such a valuation all known losses should obviously be written off. The question may then arise as to whether this writing-off should be covered by special grants, or not. This is a question of economic expediency, which obviously has no necessary connection with the principles for the long-run balancing of the budget.

Now, in connection with the budget estimates, the Swedish Government in January 1938 introduced a special "transitional budget". It was in the nature of an initial regulation of the State assets and liabilities, and made a heavy call on the exchequer for the covering of the sums written off. On the other hand, the Government were prepared without special cover to write off no less than 122 million kronor on investments in unprofitable State railway lines. This shows that no fundamental principle was at stake, and that the Government could have considerably reduced their demands for the cover of writing-off without in any way prejudicing the intended reform of the budget. The covering of this writing-off in point of fact simply means that at a time when the burden of taxation is extremely heavy the taxpayers are compelled to accumulate vast sums in order to increase the State property. The expenditure of such a policy cannot be judged without due regard to its effects on industry and commerce.

In the budget estimates submitted at the beginning of the 1938 session the Government adduced the reasons which, in their view, argued for an overbalancing of the budget in years of prosperity. As the overbalancing would entail the consequence that the Government would not need to have recourse to the domestic capital market to the same extent as otherwise, that market should be more abundantly supplied with money when the Government in a coming period of depression had to borrow more than normally. This argument is not very convincing. If the overbalancing is attained by needlessly heavy taxation, which substantially affects the accumulation of capital, it can scarcely be expected that the intended relief of the capital market will actually be achieved. In the long run, according to the Minister of Finance, reduced borrowing in years of prosperity should entail a reduction in the interest on the national debt. This, however, is hardly a sufficently powerful motive for keeping down State borrowing. The experience of many countries shows that the risk of an increase in the interest charges does not deter Governments from the continuous increase of an unproductive national debt.

Also in the international discussion on the

burden of national debts we find astonishing haziness about these matters. We often hear people expatiating on the wickedness of "throwing burdens onto the future". But in regard to the significance of this process they usually have the vaguest ideas, due to a mistaken application of the rules of private economy to the laws of social economy. What really happens when the State has recourse to borrowing in order to meet its current expenditure is that the State, not content with the taxation of the nation to the limit of their power to bear it, is beginning to make calls also on their thrift. This, of course, opens up a wide field for increased State expenditure. Several countries have already gone a long way on this downhill path to financial ruin. The consequence is that savings will not be available to the normal extent for general economic progress. It will begin to slow down. This retardation of the rate of progress is the real harm that is done when the State resorts to borrowing in order to meet its current expenditure. The pernicious effects of this policy will be felt even by the present generation, but will not manifest themselves in their full force till the following generation, which will find their prosperity considerably reduced as compared with the standard which should have been attainable under normal conditions.

A long-run balancing of the budget such as that now inaugurated by the Swedish Government, with a scientifically elaborated system both for the drawing-up of the budget and for the budget accounts, is of chief importance as an intended guarantee against carrying the increase of current expenditure to such a pitch that even on a long-run view it would be found necessary to cover it by borrowing, and thus by drawing on the savings of the nation. But, if this financial policy is to be really successful, it is essential that the aim in view shall not be attained by such an increase in taxation as will tend to cripple enterprise, with the result that the economic progress of the nation is nevertheless retarded. It will thus be found that even the most perfect budgetary system cannot relieve any State from solicitude for a reasonable limitation of its expenditure.

Though the budget introduced at the beginning of this year was based on the splendid results of the great boom in the preceding year, it showed an estimated overbalance of 19 million kronor only. This sum seems quite insignificant when compared with the amount of the revenue, which totalled 1,227.6 million kronor, or with the deficits which may be expected to arise in coming years of depression.

Now it was found later on in the session that, in view of the unsettled international situation, it would be neccessary to provide an additional sum of 70 million kronor to meet urgent defence expenditure. This amount was mainly covered by increased taxation, of a kind, however, apt to create distrust in business circles. Under such circumstances the plan to overbalance the budget was abandoned.

It will thus be seen that it is very difficult in practice to effect an overbalance. And, if the way is left open for the underbalancing of the budget in years of depression, the deficits are liable to swell to such proportions that the prospects of being able to cover them in a future boom will be very small.

Up to about the beginning of 1938 Sweden had enjoyed the blessings of a singularly marked boom. But when signs of a new depression began to manifest themselves with increasing clearness, especially in the United States, the leaders of Swedish financial policy had to reckon with the possibility that a period of depression might supervene in Sweden before the end of the financial year 1938—1939. The Swedish Government proposed to counter such a depression by very liberal grants for public works, and accordingly introduced, in addition to the budget estimates, a special "emergency budget", providing for an expenditure of over 230 million kronor on measures intended to meet a possible depression. This budget was to come into force when, and so far as, the Government found that a slump had set in of such severity that it would be necessary to draw on the grants. This emergency budget thus assumed the character of full powers for the Government, without further consultation of the Riksdag, to spend money on a very large scale.

The emergency budget had no revenue side, the question as to how the expenditure was to be met being left open for future decision. Should it be found necessary to have recourse to the proposed public works in the course of the financial year, it would obviously be very uncertain whether it would subsequently be possible to cut down expenditure so drastically, or to increase taxation to such a degree, that the deficit could be covered. Should we be confronted with a slump of several years' duration, an emergency budget would presumably become a regular institution. And when a new boom supervened, the possibility of a recession would have to be taken into account, so that an emergency budget could not be dispensed with in that case either. The deficits which would accumulate during a slump lasting several years would manifestly be of such magnitude that to cover them by surpluses in future overbalanced budgets would be a practical impossibility.

It is evident that expenditure to meet a possible slump — regardless of the constitutional form in which it is voted — will never be scrutinized with the same care as the expenditure of the regular budget, which must always be weighed with due regard to the difficulty of providing money to meet it. It thus seems fairly clear even now that the long-run balancing of the budget inaugurated by the leaders of Swedish financial policy, despite of its technical perfection, is liable to lead in practice to an underbalance which could never be covered. The national finances would then get into such a state that resort to borrowing in order to meet current expenditure would become a regular feature.

Many states, as we know, have already fallen into such a plight. If national expenditure is permitted to swell to such an extent that it makes calls on the savings of the nation as well as on their power to bear taxation, the result must be, as observed above, that economic progress will be seriously retarded. As regards the State finances the consequences of such a development will be that the restoration of a durable equilibrium will scarcely be possible.

KORSNÄS SÅGVERKS AKTIEBOLAG

BY WILHELM EKMAN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, KORSNÄS SÅGVERKS AB., PRESIDENT, FEDERATION OF SWEDISH INDUSTRIES.

The Korsnäs Company is one of the big wood-working companies in the north of Sweden, and its history is characteristic of the general development in the Swedish wood goods and paper industries. The foundation of the company during the early years of the growth of the sawmill industry in the middle of the nineteenth century was intended to serve also purposes of public utility. This tradition has been maintained through many changes and vicissitudes in regard to timber-cutting, communications and production, down to present days, with their high standard of forestry, rationalization of production and intensive technical research.

The Gävle district has always been noted for its excellent wood goods. At the beginning of the 16th century one of the first "crown sawmills" in the country was erected in the vicinity of that town. During the latter half of the 16th century a number of small sawmills were set up near many waterfalls in the River Testebo directly north of Gävle. They sold their timber to Gävle merchants, who exported it on their own ships. The flourishing sawmill industry and the export of sawn wood goods was ruined in 1636 by regulations prohibiting the towns on the Gulf of Bothnia from sending ships south of Stockholm. After some minor alleviations these regulations were abolished by the Riksdag in 1765, whereupon the trade of the little city once more began to flourish. Among the men who took the lead in developing the commerce and shipping of this city we note members of the Brändström, Elfstrand, Elfbring, Ennes, Garberg, Göransson, Murén and Rettig families. They endeavoured to enter into business relations with foreign countries as well as with the extensive up-country which had its natural outlet via the port of Gävle. In Gästrikland and Dalarna there were a score of iron works, which, though very small according to modern ideas, were of very considerable importance in the latter half of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th. The Gävle merchants tried to form business connections with these iron works. They succeeded as regards those in Gästrikland, but those in Dalarna adhered firmly to their connections with Västerås and Söderhamn, through which the major part of their commerce passed.

Though new fast sailing vessels were built at the Gävle shipyards, and though no less than 26 per cent. of the entire Swedish fleet of sailing vessels were registered at Gävle, it was of no avail. The shipowners were faced with the fact that 70 per cent. of the outward bound vessels had to sail in ballast.

Per Murén, the leading personality in the city of Gävle in the nineteenth century, realized the necessity of changing these conditions. He saw that the commerce of the city would greatly benefit if a railway connection with the valley of Lake Siljan could be established. With the assistance of Petre, the burgomaster, he carried on a vigorous campaign in his native city and in the Riksdag for the construction of a railway which would bring the port into communication with the Dalecarlian district. The building of this line, the Gävle—Dala Railway, was started in 1855.

Per Murén, however, did not rest content with the creation of a railway. His main objective was the extensive use of that railway for the carriage of goods consigned from his native town. He understood the necessity of providing more goods than could be produced by the small iron works of those days. It happened that, in the course of an investigation into the economic

basis of the railway, the director of the "office for the delimitation of crown lands" in the County of Kopparberg, Lt. de Laval, had suggested the desirability of erecting a large sawmill on Lake Runn, in the Falun district. He thought that this would tend considerably to increase the goods traffic on the railway, which passes close by the lake. Murén fell in with that suggestion. And he carried it out in such a way that imports into the port of Gävle have ever since been balanced by exports.

De Laval was summoned and authorized on behalf of a syndicate of Gävle merchants to acquire the rights of cutting thick trees in favourably situated forests in the County of Kopparberg, where these rights had been offered for sale. In virtue of this authorization he immediately purchased the rights of cutting timber in forests in the Sofia Magdalena and Järna districts. A statutory meeting was convened at Gävle in 1855. The following persons presented themselves as promoters and intending shareholders:

Per Murén	R. Rettig
G. de Laval	G. F. Göransson
A. Lundeberg	F. M. Berndtson
C. L. Schoultz	G. Luth
C. E. Nylén	Dan Elfstrand
F. O. Flensburg	W. Elfbrink.

All these persons are now dead and in several cases their families are extinct. But, as the company note with gratification, the nucleus of their shareholders consists of descendants of the founders. A tradition has thus been formed, which has set its stamp on the whole enterprise.

Work was started at once. The location of the new sawmill was determined, and within a few months foundations were laid on the little promontory which juts out at Korsnäs into lake Runn. At the same time extensive preparations were made for the transportation of timber in the forests as well as for timber-floating. The once deserted forests resounded with the busy hum of life, and much money was earned by the local population, who had previously been dependent on casual labour in Stockholm or at the iron works and on the estates of southern Sweden.

The methods of cutting and floating timber were then quite different from what they are now. Although, in respect of large areas, the company had acquired the right to cut any trees measuring 10 inches in girth to a height of 20 feet, it was not customary to cut timber of less than 12 inches in thickness. And the timber-floating proceeded very slowly indeed. In the newly cleared floating-ways, where timber can now be floated down to Korsnäs in a few weeks, it took aout three years to float a sufficient amount of timber to the mill to make it worth while to commence sawing.

The sawmill plant was completed in 1858. In the middle of the building were the boilers, flanked by the two steam engines, operating the eight double saw-frames and the edge-saws. All the machinery had been ordered, then as now, from the firm of J. & C. G. Bolinder. This sawmill, which was burnt down in 1911, was one of the largest in Sweden and very modern for its time. It was, for example, provided with its own gas-works for illuminating purposes. The gas was obtained by the dry distillation of wood waste.

The timber sawn was immediately consigned by rail to Gävle, where timber-yards had been erected on either side of the river, on the quays of what is now "the inner harbour".

During the time when the plants were in course of construction additional timber-cutting rights had been acquired, so that the supply of timber was secured for several years ahead. In acquiring these rights the company were on the look-out for very old pines with an abundance of heartwood, which — if they were healthy trees — could yield the superior timber which at this time was considered to be the only kind worth exporting. The supplies of timber per acre were thus very small. According to a report drawn up in the eighteen-seventies the number of trees averaged merely ten per acre, and a large number of them were certainly damaged.

As only ancient trees were thought to be fit

for sawing, and as it was supposed that these trees alone could keep afloat during the long floating period, which was usually two years and sometimes three, the whole sawmill business assumed the character of a slow "clearance sale" which could continue only as long as such old trees were still available. Lt. de Laval had estimated the number of trees, measuring 12 to 15 inches at the top, which could be annually cut "for all time to come" at 600,000. We now know quite well that, when these thick old trees have once been cut, such giants will not be obtainable any more. Modern forestry, with its short cycles, is not adapted for the production of three-hundred-year-old pines.

This fact was soon realized. It was therefore considered prudent not to reckon with too long a period for the sale of this timber. Fifty to sixty years was deemed to be a reasonable limit. And in fact purchases of raw timber were made with that period in view. Most of the floating-ways were equipped with wooden constructions, and the whole organization was of a rather loose character. By a law of 1889, however, it was



GENERALSTABENS LITOGR. ANSTALT, STHLM

prescribed that contracts for the right to cut timber should not be valid for more than twenty years, and from beginning of 1905 the period was reduced to five years. Furthermore, the timber companies gradually realized that even smaller trees than those with a girth of 12 inches at the top could produce marketable sawn timber. The result of all this was that the timber companies began to follow the example of the more firmly organized iron works by direct purchases of forest and by carrying on forestry on scientific lines. But the purchases of raw timber and the clearing of floating-ways consumed much capital. And very skilful management on the part of economically trained directors was required in order to enable the companies to struggle through the crises which occurred at short intervals. The money earned which was not spent in working costs and dividends was invested in purchases of timber or of new landed property. Such property as well as timber-cutting rights and raw timber were in fact offered on a very large scale. Korsnäs obviously could not come forward as the sole purchasers. We soon found competitors, the principal of which were Kopparbergs Bergslag, Kopparberg and Hofors, Tottie & Arfwedsson, Skutskärs Aktiebolag and Gråda Aktiebolag.

A law restricting the right of companies to purchase real property in the northern part of Sweden came into force in 1905. In the course of the quarter-century between 1880 and the last-mentioned date Korsnäs had acquired about 160,000 hectares (about approximately 400,000 acres) of productive forest land in upper Dalarna. In the immediately succeeding years about 40,000 hectares (approximately 100,000 acres) of forest land had been purchased from the large iron works in Gästrikland, where the acquisition of land by companies was not then prohibited. By buying up of the shares in Trävaruaktiebolaget Dalarne and in Gimo-Österby Bruk, Korsnäs have obtained in addition 100,000 hectares of forest land, so that their total area of forest land now amounts to 300,000 hectares (about 750,000 acres).

The whole of this area is under systematic forestry, based on economic and scientific principles. In those parts where primeval forests still exist, and where the growth is thus very insignificant, the timber-cutting exceeds the growth; in those large areas where the ages of the trees are evenly distributed the cutting approximately corresponds to the growth; and in the Gimo forests (those most recently purchased), where timber fit for sawing is practically non-existent, the cutting is on a smaller scale than the growth.

At regular intervals Korsnäs have made thorough investigations into the available amount of timber, the age distribution in the forest stands, growth, cutting etc. According to the latest available figures, the amount of timber in all the forests taken together averages 70 cubic metres, the growth 2.3 cubic metres and the amount of timber cut 2.2 cubic metres, all per hectare (about $2^1/_2$ acres) of productive forest land. Experience has taught us that such conservative forestry, in conjunction with intensive thinning, yields an ever increasing growth, which warrants also the cutting of timber on an increasing scale.

At the present time Korsnäs obtain 63 per cent. of their timber from their own forests. There is good reason to presume that this figure can be increased according as forest culture is intensified.

So far as was considered necessary, the plants at Korsnäs were modernized. The lack of concentration involved in the situation of the sawmill at a distance of 60 English miles from the port of shipment entailed immense difficulties as well as great expense. In the middle of the eighteen-nineties it was, therefore, decided to remove the whole sawmill business to Kastet, in the vicinity of Gävle, where an area of about 500 hectares (approximately 1,250 acres) was available at the entrance to Gävle harbour.

At this spot a sawmill, planing-mills and timber-yards were erected. Some years afterwards chemical pulp mills and paper mills were built and enlarged, as well as a spirit distillery and other plants for the utilization of the waste products.

The output from the Korsnäs plants is shown by the following tabular summary:

Sawmill industry.

The Kastet sawmill near Gävle . . 24,000 stds wood goods
The Korsnäs sawmill near Falun . . 4,000 » » »
The Vansbro sawmill (in Dalarna) . 7,000 » » »
Out of these amounts about 10,000 standards are planed.
About 5,000 standards are used in the box factories and some 6,000 standards for ready made wooden houses, which are sold exclusively on the home market.

Chemical pulp industry.

The sulphite pulp mill at Karskär (near Gävle) . . . . . 65,000 tons strong sulphite
The sulphate pulp mill at Karskär 40.000 » » sulphate
The paper mill at Karskär . . . 5,000 » paper
Among the by-products: 2,000 tons of 95 per cent. spirit
200 » » turpentine
and 2,000 » » liquid rosin.

In addition, Korsnäs owns half the shares in Karlholms Aktiebolag's wallboard factory with an output capacity of 15,000 tons of hard and porous wallboards.

The main items of the income and expenditure of the company in 1937 are tabulated below in percentages:

Income.

Sawmills products	30 per cent.
Chemical pulp products	60 » »
Forest products	6 » »
Miscellaneous	4 » »
Total	100 per cent.

Expenditure.

Purchase of raw materials	10 per cent.
Timber floating	4 » »
Wages of workers in forests and industries	37 » »
» » foremen » » » »	4 » »
Salaries	2 » »
Pensions	2 » »
Machinery, buildings, materials and fittings	21 » »
Freights and railway rates	5 » »
Dividend	5 » »
Miscellaneous	10 » »
Total	100 per cent.

The Korsnäs works, as Kastet and Karskär jointly are called, are driven by three high-pressure boilers and two STAL (Ljungströms) turbines. They produce 7,500 KW counter-pressure power and 2,000 KW condensing power, which for the present suffices for the entire industry. As a reserve in case of future extensions, Korsnäs, having a holding of one-sixth in the Krångede Power Works, has a corresponding share in the 90,000 KW generated there.

The situation of the Korsnäs works at the mouth of the floating-way, in close proximity to large, richly wooded, forests and at a port which is, practically speaking, ice-free, with good communications, and where the largest steamers can load straight from the quay, is a combination of favourable factors which has served as a stimulus to continuous progress. The company have made systematic efforts to improve the quality of their products, from the treatment of the growing timber down to the elaboration at the works. Inferior timber is discarded from the outset by thinning the forests, so that the quality of the remaining forest stands is improved. The pulp mills are equipped with a laboratory department, where eminent engineers are perpetually busy in trying to devise new methods for the production of various kinds of superior pulp. It is noteworthy that this department in 1937 entailed a cost of 200,000 kronor.

In spite of many individual differences, it may be stated that the development of the timber companies in the north of Sweden has proceeded on uniform lines, and that the goal they have had in view has been, broadly speaking, the same, namely the continuous improvement of forestry, the rationalization of industry, and financial consolidation. Korsnäs affords a good example of the aims and achievements of the Swedish timber companies in these respects.

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THE MENACING DECREASE OF THE POPULATION IN NORTH-WESTERN EUROPE

BY K.-G. HAGSTROEM, D. Sc.

The Mechanism of the Population Trend.

Among the biological factors which determine the development of a nation, one, namely *mortality,* has, for a long past, been carefully investigated. The possibility of calculating the number of deaths in a group of persons is the basis of scientific life insurance. Such calculations can be made also for a whole population, and serve as a basis for a forecast of the future size of generations already existing, which will be valid with tolerable accuracy for a considerably succession of years.

It is much more difficult to calculate the numbers of the annually supervening new year-groups, that is, to estimate the *fecundity* of the existing and subsequently arising number of women of procreative age.

Just as estimates of mortality are based on a function which varies with age, the so-called *force of mortality,* so can the probable number of births be calculated on the basis of the *force of fecundity,* which can be deduced from the available statistical data. It depends on the time which has elapsed since marriage, the number of children already born, and so forth. For statistical purposes one has to content oneself with approximate estimates in the shape of simple averages, as for example the number of births per woman of a certain age, per married woman of a certain age, or simply per woman of procreative age. With due allowance for errors inherent in the roughness of the method, such a computation of the number of newly born children in a given year can serve as a basis for a satisfactory general estimate.

The future population trend may thus be considered to depend on the above-mentioned statistically determined biological functions and on the known initial position. The first question the student should ask himself is what the trend would be *if the existing fecundity and mortality remained constant.* He should then investigate what would be the effect of certain assumed *changes* in these functions, and especially what would be the result of a continuation of the changes hitherto observed.

An example of such forecasts with a given initial position, but with different estimates of the rate of fecundity, is shown in diagram I. It represents the Norwegian population trend after the year 1928, on the basis of the same mortality, but with different assumptions regarding the level of fecundity. The birth rates are 80, 98 and 107 annually per thousand women within the ages of 15 to 45 years inclusive, and it is assumed that they will remain constant. With the given initial position they result in a continuously falling, a stationary, and a continuously increasing population. They thus comprise a rich variety of possibilities of future development.

From an economic point of view, *changes in the distribution of the age-groups* may be considered to be the most interesting feature in the population trend. Human beings, generally speaking, are economically productive during part of their life only: children and old people are economically negative, in that they have to be supported by others. This may be effected by the interest on an accumulated fortune being the property of the person supported, or by a more or less voluntary undertaking to support a dependant, which may also be secured by life insurance. If, as is usual, the population is divided into three classes, namely children (up to 15 years), active persons (16 to 65 years) and

old people (over 65 years), this will give us some idea of the economic importance of the age-groups.

These matters may be made more tangible by first calculating the number of old people and children per active person, and then making a rough estimate of the "*maintenance burden*". In computations made by the author on these lines, the "maintenance burden" has been estimated by adding the number of old people per active person to *half* the number of children per active person. The statistical number thus obtained should give some idea of the burden falling on the active members of the national community in supporting the passive, reckoned in "maintenance units"[1]. The estimate is therefore unaffected by fluctuations in the purchasing value of money. It is for the sake of simplicity that the cost of maintenance for a child has been estimated at half the corresponding cost for an adult. To have adopted such reductions to "units of consumption" as are usually made in statistical investigations of the cost of living of nations would have been an unnecessary complication, besides which the reduction factors usually adopted in such investigations, in view of the need of clothes etc., for older children, may be considered to be estimated unduly low. One-half should therefore be an acceptable average, also from this point ov view.

Figures indicating the "maintenance burden" in the "model" population at three different dates in the future, under the different above-mentioned assumptions regarding the rate of fecundity, will be found in table I. It is interesting to note that in all three alternatives, with the given initial position, the "maintenance burden" shows a tendency to *increase*, but that the figures are relatively smaller where the birth rate is high than where it is low. The increasing "maintenance burden", is obviously the result of the preceding population trend, which has been mainly characterized — in Norway as elsewhere — by a markedly falling mortality concurrently with a disastrously dwindling birth rate.

As LOTKA has shown, the assumption of con-

[1] Representing the cost of supporting one adult or two hildren.

Diagram I. Estimate of the Development of the Norwegian People after 1928.



The estimate is based on 3 alternative assumptions regarding the average fecundity (in respect of children of both sexes) of women of age of from 20 to 45 years.

stant rates of mortality and fecundity eventually results in a stable age-distribution with a continuously growing, stationary, or steadily falling total population, its rate of growth (positive or negative) being dependent on the relative level of the rate of fecundity.

Table I. Trend of a "Model" Population, with Different Assumptions Regarding a Constant Birth Rate.

(Population of Norway 1928; population estimates of S. D. WICKSELL.)

	Year 1948	Year 1998	Year 2048
Birth rate 80 per thousand women			
Age-group 0 to 15 years . .	666	494	357
» 10 » 65 » . .	2,082	1,684	1,233
» 65 years and over .	285	451	329
Total	*3,033*	*2,629*	*1,919*
Maintenance burden per cent:			
children	16.0	14.7	14.5
old people	13.7	26.8	26.7
Total	29.7	41.5	41.2
Birth rate 98 per thousand women			
Age-group 0 to 15 years . .	816	805	804
» 15 » 65 » . .	2,127	2,275	2,267
» 65 years and over .	285	479	488
Total	*3,228*	*3,559*	*3,559*
Maintenance burden per cent:			
children	19.2	17.7	17.7
old people	13.4	21.1	21.5
total	32.6	38.8	39.2
Birth rate 107 per thousand women			
Age-group 0 to 15 years . .	891	997	1,145
» 15 » 65 » . .	2,149	2,601	2,966
» 65 years and over .	285	492	581
Total	*3,325*	*4,090*	*4,692*
Maintenance burden per cent:			
children	20.7	19.2	19.3
old people	13.3	18.9	19.6
total	34.0	38.1	38.9

An Economic Parallel.

The generative faculty in a living being may be regarded as the principal manifestation of its creative power, its productivity. In human beings this creative power is active also in the scientific, artistic and economic spheres. As KEYNES has observed, the spirit of enterprise, the desire to invest is the outcome of an optimistic mentality, and not merely of satisfactory calculations. The material manifestation of productivity in the business world is the interest on capital. It is therefore no coincidence, but inherent in the nature of things, that the growth both of population and of capital proceeds, mathematically, in accordance with the rules of compound interest, or the "law of exponential growth".

Just as the biological productivity of the human race has hitherto led, generally speaking, to a rising population, so has capital as a rule shown a "positive" productivity. In other words, the interest on capital has been maintained at a fairly constant level above zero. During the time of the Roman Empire, for example, a rate of interest of about 5 % was considered normal, whilst a rate of 1 % per month *(usura centesima)* was regarded as a maximum. In modern times the yield on industrial capital has, broadly speaking, been lower, but the difference is not marked. It should be observed that the productivity of capital is due to the activity of the mind which plans and leads the enterprise. But also the productivity of capital invested in industry has in recent times been seriously questioned. There are certain economists who believe in a definitive fall of the rate of interest to a lower average level than heretofore.

It is plausible to trace the decline of North-western Europe in biological productivity (but also in regard to the productivity of capital) to the depressing experiences of the present younger generation. The remarkable industrial development in the nineteenth century may be regarded, in some measure, as the outcome of a general belief in technical and scientific progress. The last generations, who have experienced a world war, a no less disillusioning peace, the introduction of dictatorships, the degeneration of democracies, and, despite of all efforts to organize peace and disarmament, new wars and new armaments, have indeed had ample reason for pessimism.

The Population Trend in Sweden.

The population trend in Sweden is illustrated in diagrams II and III, which show (1) the size of the population and the distribution of age-groups, (2) the variations in the "maintenance

burden". As regards the period after 1925 we have adopted the "extrapolation" computed by Cramér for the account of the 1928 Pensions Insurance Committee, which, broadly speaking, implies constant rates of fecundity and mortality. It should be noted that the period during which the rates of fecundity were markedly falling coincides with a time when, according to the results of an enquiry made by the above-mentioned committee, individual saving in Sweden had been steadily increasing. It seems that the increase in the "maintenance burden" in respect of old persons which, according to diagram II, was noticeable from the eighteen-eighties, in conjunction with increasing saving, had greatly conduced to the decline in the birth rate which began to be observable in the decade just mentioned, but did not become marked till some twenty years later.

In order to facilitate comparison between the trends, the birth rates have been inserted in diagram II.

The decrease of mortality — a solely gratifying phenomenon in the history of mankind —, which is due to modern progress in the spheres of economy, hygiene and medicine, is statistically noticeable at any rate from the middle of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the decline of the birth rate, is generally speaking, of later date. The fact that the fall of the birth rate began in France lends support to our supposition that it is directly connected with the development of thrift, which in itself is a factor of the greatest importance in economic activity.

Reduced to extreme simplicity, the results as far as Sweden is concerned may be roughly summarized as follows. Supporters of families at the end of the nineteenth century, actuated by economic motives, which had been manifested in increased saving, had come to the conclusion that they could not indulge in the luxury of many children; either because the maintenance of aged members of the family was already straining the household economy, or because the more numerous older year-groups had restricted the sources of livelihood for the younger.

Whether such motives were clearly conscious or not, they serve to explain why the "birth

Diagram II. Development of Swedish Population 1750—1925 and a Tentative Extrapolation till the Year of 2020.



The shaded part of the diagram relates to persons of an age fit for work; the other parts relate to children and old people.

Table 2. Trend of "maintenance burden" in Sweden.

Estimate of »maintenance burden» per 100 persons of active age.

Year	Thousand persons of the age of				Per 100 active persons (15 to 65 years)			Maintenance burden per 100 active persons: for children 0.5, for old persons 1.
	0 to 15 yrs.	15 to 65 yrs.	65 to ∞ years	Total	Children	Half thereof	Old persons	
1750	591	1,079	111	1,781	54.8	27.4	10.3	37.7
1760	659	1,154	112	1,925	57.1	28.6	9.7	38.3
1770	672	1,260	111	2,043	53.3	26.7	8.8	35.5
1780	672	1,337	109	2,118	50.3	25.2	8.2	33.4
1790	699	1,367	122	2,188	51.5	25.6	8.9	34.5
1800	759	1,455	133	2,347	52.2	26.1	9.1	35.2
1810	756	1,518	123	2,396	49.8	24.9	8.1	33.0
1820	835	1,610	140	2,585	51.8	25.9	8.7	34.6
1830	1,024	1,711	153	2,888	59.8	29.9	8.9	38.8
1840	1,054	1,935	150	3,139	54.5	27.2	7.8	35.0
1850	1,147	2,168	168	3,483	52.9	26.4	7.8	34.2
1860	1,293	2,366	201	3,860	54.6	27.3	8.5	35.8
1870	1,420	2,522	227	4,169	56.3	28.1	9.0	37.1
1880	1,488	2,809	269	4,566	53.0	26.5	9.6	36.1
1890	1,593	2,824	368	4,785	56.4	28.2	13.0	41.2
1900	1,666	3,040	430	5,136	54.8	27.4	14.1	41.5
1910	1,751	3,305	466	5,522	53.0	26.5	14.1	40.6
1920	1,729	3,679	496	5,904	47.0	23.5	13.5	37.0
1930	[1] 1,535	[1] 4,092	[1] 571	[1] 6,198	[1] 37.5	[1] 18.8	[1] 14.0	[1] 38.8
1940	[2] 1,403	[1] 4,448	[1] 616	[1] 6,467	[2] 31.5	[2] 15.8	[1] 13.8	[1] 29.6
1950	[2] 1,426	[1] 4,530	[1] 710	[1] 6,666	[2] 31.5	[2] 15.8	[1] 15.7	[1] 31.5
1960	[2] 1,381	[1] 4,542	[1] 824	[1] 6,747	[2] 30.4	[2] 15.2	[1] 18.1	[1] 33.3
1970	[2] 1,310	[1] 4,415	[1] 958	[1] 6,683	[2] 29.7	[2] 14.9	[1] 21.7	[1] 36.6
1980	[2] 1,251	[1] 4,181	[1] 1,072	[1] 6,504	[2] 29.9	[2] 15.0	[1] 25.6	[1] 40.6
1990	[2] 1,213	[2] 3,983	[1] 1,059	[1] 6,255	[2] 30.4	[2] 15.2	[1] 26.6	[1] 41.8
2000	[2] 1,169	[2] 3,879	[1] 946	[1] 5,994	[2] 30.1	[2] 15.0	[1] 24.4	[1] 39.4
2010	[2] 1,120	[2] 3,731	[1] 914	[1] 5,765	[2] 30.0	[2] 15.0	[1] 24.5	[1] 39.5
2020	[2] 1,075	[2] 3,577	[2] 901	[2] 5,553	[2] 30.0	[2] 15.0	[2] 25.2	[2] 40.2

strike" has spread and assumed such proportions that nowadays — when the swings of the pendulum have been unexpectedly marked — a decrease of the population is impending. Setting aside the possibility of protracted wars, revolutions or new pestilences, it is evident that this tendency could be checked only by a rapid and substantial increase of the birth rate. The consequences of a declining birth rate are bound to be of great economic importance. For example, the "maintenance burden" falling on the active members of the community will inevitably be increased. This burden will become still heavier in the course of the next few decades, if it should be found possible, by shifting the incidence of taxation or by a system of rewards for supporters of children, to increase the rate of reproduction. Not till after the lapse of a lengthy period of difficulties would the favourable economic effects of a rising birth rate manifest themselves. This, again, makes it less probable that any really effective measures for checking the fall of the birth rate will be carried out. In the nature of things, the difficulties of the day loom much larger than even a calamity in a distant future.

[1] These figures *partly estimated.*
[2] » » *entirely estimated.*

Consequences of a Decrease of the Population.

Several authors have discussed the economic difficulties which are likely to arise on a decrease in the size of the population, particularly in regard to the adjustments which will have to be made in the business world when the volume of the existing requirements begins to show a marked decline. Such a contingency, however, is not a necessary consequence of a decrease of the population. The abundance of money which may result at the same time should instead evoke new needs. This might entail a greater demand for luxury goods, which would serve, economically speaking, to counterbalance a declining demand for necessaries. The decrease in the number of children has doubtless already entailed some readjustments in the industrial world. To express this in grotesque simplification, makers of cradles have been obliged to devote their energy to the extension of other lines of manufacture. This example indicates how slightly the business world at large is affected by successive changes. Joiners who produce nothing but cradles have never existed. And the necessary readjustment does not seem to have caused more trouble than those changes in customs and fashions which in all times have entailed reorganization of production.

It might be supposed that the presumable decline in the consumption of foodstuffs in connection with a decrease of population would affect the market for agricultural produce. In point of fact a concurrent increase in the demand for good quality might be expected. It is not inconceivable that the farmer's turnover might

actually increase, parallell with a diminution of primitive requirements.

A more serious matter is the disappearance of the stimulus to the industrial world which is involved in the automatic increase of every individual need. It has been observed that the risk of miscalculation on the part of the producers was considerably smaller so long as there was hope that the demand would grow apace with the production, even if it was on somewhat too large a scale. The mere idea of a coming shrinkage of the market is bound to have a depressing effect. When the population is declining it is essential that the greatest attention should be paid to the accumulation of depreciation funds. This might possibly be effected by cooperative organization or by some mode of insurance. The financial consolidation of the large Swedish industries is one of the bright spots in a gloomy picture.

On the other hand, the difficulties experienced by an individual country will presumably be greater the more isolated it is in regard to the decrease of its population. The consequences of the population trend will not come into clear relief until the problem is viewed internationally. Friendly cooperation between the nations will become more urgent according as disparities in the domestic markets of individual countries become more evident.

Prospects and Remedies.

In the view of many sociologists the declining birth rate is a direct consequence of the spread of knowledge regarding the use of contra-

Diagram III. A Male Adult's Burden of Support of Persons Depending on Him in Percentage of His Own Maintenance Requirements.

Based on Conditions in Sweden.



In the shaded part of the diagram a curve has been inserted showing the number of living children born per annum per thousand of the population.

ceptives. In this article, on the other hand, it is maintained that the ultimate cause of the phenomenon is rather a negative view of life. Contraceptive methods have existed in all times, from the purest and most natural, celibacy, to the most criminal, artificial abortion. But only when the habitual mood of the human soul has become coloured with such apathy or gloom as during the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, or in our own times, does the use of these contrivances spread to such extent as to end in checking the natural growth of the population. It seems therefore that this evil can scarcely be effectively remedied by intrusive interference with the marital conditions of the population.

It should be observed that pessimism and its outer reflexion, the decline of generative power, does not extend, even in Northwestern Europe, to all sections of the population. Something could doubtless be done to raise the social influence of the productive elements. In this spirit, and as a simple act of justice towards those who bear self-imposed burdens for the sake of the future, one should welcome any proposals designed to lighten the load on large families or to "honour one's father and mother"; but scarcely in the hope that such measures in themselves would serve as an encouragement to many marriages and large numbers of children. In accordance with the views set forth above, the proper way to deal with this problem would be to try to revive that buoyant view of life and faith in the future which is indispensable for any productive activity.

To follow SPENGLER and his fellow-thinkers in interpreting the look on the face of the times as the expression of utter hopelessness, or to view the decline of the birth rate as a sign that greed and materialism in the western countries have deadened those forces of the soul which are the mainspring of productivity, would indeed be a gross exaggeration. But economic life does require a powerful stimulus and the revival of confidence, something that will sustain individual producers and induce them to take a constructive view of the future. In these times we need optimism and optimists.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF JUNE 1938

The General Situation. The unsettled political situation in Europe and frustrated hopes of greater business activity in the United States have disturbed that tendency towards a stabilization of the prices of raw materials on the world market which was noticeable from the end of November 1937 to the middle of March 1938. The price indices of raw materials for the United States (Moody's) and Great Britain (Reuter's), which are reckoned in percentage of the prices in December and September, 1931, reached at the beginning of April 1937 the peak figures 228.1 and 202.2, respectively. By the 12th March 1938 the index numbers had fallen to 150.3 and 144.9, and by the end of May to 130.2 and 128.9, respectively, which is a lower level than at any time since the first half of 1934. The much smaller demand for raw materials, especially those for industrial purposes, has naturally tended to reduce purchasing power in those countries which produce such commodities as well as to increase the rigour of import and currency restrictions. During the first quarter of this year world commerce was reduced by 12 per cent. as compared with the immediately preceding quarter and is now showing a tendency towards further shrinkage, which is reflected in shipping by the diminution of freights. It does not seem likely that there will be a general increase in production and trade

during the summer, when there is normally a lull in business activity. But, in view of the paramount importance of the United States as a consumer of raw products, there is reason to hope that an impulse towards an improvement in business may come from America in the course of the autumn, when the harvest season has commenced, when stocks have been exhausted, and when national expenditure as well as the modification of the taxation system have begun to show their stimulating effects.

In Sweden business conditions still show the character of a boom. The business activity index of the Skandinaviska Bank, which relates to the clearing of commercial paper, was 119.0 (1929 = 100) for April and May 1938, as compared with 120.7 during the first quarter of this year and 127.7 (the peak figure) for the third quarter of 1937. Whereas, owing to the fall of prices and the natural reaction to the abnormally high business activity, a marked decline had previously been noticeable, the recession during the last few months, to judge by these figures, has been quite insignificant.

According to the latest available statistics, building activity in the larger towns was very intense during the first quarter of this year, which was also marked by the grant of an unusually large number of building permits in those towns. Similar observations have been made by the banks, in their loan business, as regards rural areas, where house-building has been stimulated by the industrial expansion last year, by the increased spending power of the population, and by the favourable weather during the spring of this year.

Reports from industries indicate that at the beginning of this quarter company directors almost everywhere had anticipated a reduction of business. Hitherto, however, there have been, broadly speaking, no marked reductions of output. And the figures for unemployment at the beginning of the quarter were in general at a uniquely low level for that season of the year, the only noteworthy exceptions being the iron and textile industries and, in some measure, also the engineering workshops. Industrial production, which, according to the statistics of the Federation of Swedish Industries, during the last quarter of 1937 was about 48 per cent. larger than in the peak year 1929, had fallen by about 4 per cent. by April 1938.

The boom in industrial production, as we know, has been sustained in some measure by the working-off of previous orders. As regards

Business Activity Index of the Skandinaviska Bank.

Season adjusted index numbers relating to the clearing turnover (1929 = 100).



——— Original figures referring to the value of the clearing.

- - - - - - - - Quantity figures (after re-reckoning on the basis of the average of the wholesale price and the cost-of-living indices.)

Note. The figures for the second quarter of 1938 refer to the months April—May.

exports of wood products, a decrease is to be noted in the sales of sulphate pulp and especially of paper. The paper mills have in fact very considerably reduced their output, namely of "Scankraft" by 65 per cent., of "Scangrease-proof" by 50 per cent. and of "Scansulphite" by 50 per cent. As for sawn wood goods, the European Timber Exporters Convention (ETEC) have announced that offers for export this year from member countries and Canada will be reduced by about 300,000 standards, over and above the previously determined reduction of 580,000 standards. This is equivalent to a total decrease of about 25 per cent. as compared with 1937.

The situation on the domestic iron market is still difficult to judge, owing to the previous accumulation of stocks. But, in view of the price reductions effected, the considerably reduced importation of iron, and the approaching exhaustion of the stocks held by large consumers, there is reason to expect the eventual stabilization of this market. In other home-market industries there have likewise been indications of a temporary recession, in that the number of orders booked has shown some diminution. It should be observed, however, that there has been no noticeable decrease in the consumption of necessaries on the part of the general public.

As regards foreign trade, we note a fall in the figures for imports. Besides the above-mentioned reduction in the importation of iron, there has been some decrease in the importation of coal and coke as well as of raw materials for the textile industries. The exports, on the other hand, have been well maintained. This is partly due to the exceptionally large shipments of iron ore as well as to the high figures for the export of certain kinds of machinery, etc. We have not, however, yet reached the height of the season for shipments of wood goods and pulp, and this year a relative decline may then be expected. But the surplus of imports for that part of the year which has so far elapsed is remarkably small.

	Imports	Exports	Surplus of imports
		Million kronor	
Jan.—April 1929	504	432	73
» » 1930	543	440	103
» » 1931	447	292	154
» » 1932	379	260	119
» » 1933	336	255	81
» » 1934	397	331	66
» » 1935	445	345	99
» » 1936	504	402	102
» » 1937	635	500	135
» » 1938	646	570	77

During the first four months of the year there was a small export of capital, due to bond loans raised in Sweden by neighbouring countries, to other imports of securities, and to the repayment of credits raised abroad during 1937 as a safeguard against losses on the foreign exchanges. The aggregate book value of the currency holdings and gold stock of the Riksbank

Employment in the Industry.



[1] The season variations have been eliminated.

Exports	Wood Goods 1,000 m³	Wood Pulp (estimated air-dry weight 1,000 tons)				Paper and Pasteboard 1,000 tons
		Mechanical	Sulphite	Sulphate	Total	
Jan.—April						
1929 . .	677	42.4	185.1	88.8	316.3	146.06
1930 . .	693	52.4	187.2	77.0	316.6	157.02
1931 . .	336	38.2	113.1	67.2	218.5	118.73
1932 . .	452	29.2	126.3	91.9	247.4	163.16
1933 . .	466	63.9	179.4	83.6	326.8	159.31
1934 . .	437	61.6	232.1	164.6	458.3	178.43
1935 . .	411	53.7	235.0	158.2	446.9	199.49
1936 . .	486	61.0	273.1	191.3	525.4	205.93
1937 . .	396	58.9	298.2	190.4	547.5	220.73
1938 . .	450	57.2	283.6	161.1	501.9	156.25

Exports	Iron Ore 1,000 tons	Pig Iron etc. 1,000 tons	Wrought Iron and Steel 1,000 tons	Workshop[1] Products Mill. kr.	Butter tons	Bacon tons
Jan.—April						
1929 . .	2,286	17.77	42.02	35.3	7,385	6,111
1930 . .	2,842	13.46	34.79	41.6	9,735	8,173
1931 . .	1,064	10.82	23.98	28.7	7,553	10,513
1932 . .	540	7.61	20.09	19.2	4,864	7,775
1933 . .	689	17.57	19.83	18.9	4,339	6,597
1934 . .	1,523	23.15	31.50	22.8	7,291	6,583
1935 . .	2,320	24.52	31.25	26.3	6,700	4,462
1936 . .	3,231	27 55	34.51	28.7	5,059	4,477
1937 . .	3,827	38.14	45.64	34.1	6,827	4,826
1938 . .	4,280	39.63	51.36	37.8	9,109	4,464

[1] Includes only the products of large exporting workshops.

and the commercial banks at the end of April was approximately 1,400 million kronor. It should be noted, however, that the book value of the above-mentioned assets of the Riksbank is very considerably below market value, the difference at the end of 1937 being about 485 million kronor. In their dealings with the Swedish general public, the commercial banks at the end of April 1938 showed an excess of advances over deposits amounting to 251 million kronor, as compared with 69 million kronor at the same time last year. The difference is chiefly due to increased lending, mainly against the collateral security of mortgages on real estate.

The Stock Market. The average prices, in percentage of par, of the different groups of shares listed on the Stockholm Exchange are shown in the appended table and graphs. The prices of the shares in the various companies have been »weighted» according to the value of the transactions in those shares on the stock exchange in the years 1932—1936.

As was mentioned in the preceding economic survey, the political events in Central Europe occasioned a fall of share prices in the latter half of March. Afterwards, generally speaking, there was some recovery, until in the latter half of May share prices fell again in consequence of a further aggravation of the political situation in Europe and of a general price decline on the markets for raw products. At the beginning of June, however, the level of share prices was not lower than at the end of March, especially if we take account of the fact that in many cases dividend coupons had been cashed in the intervening period. The stock market, generally speaking, is hesitant and dull. Thus in April and May this year the transactions in shares on the stock exchange amounted only to 0.75 million kronor per day, as compared with 1.65 million kronor at the same time last year.

Share Index Numbers.

Industry.



Banks.



Price Index of the Board of Trade.

——— = all goods.
- - - - - - - - = raw products.
(Average 1913 = 100.)

Laid up Swedish Tonnage.

(1,000 tons gross)



Millions of Axle-Kilometers travelled by Loaded Goods Trucks on the State Railways.



Import of Sweden.



Export of Sweden.



Monthly Import Surplus (−) or Export Surplus (+) in Mill. Kr.



Export of Paper Pulp.

(Estimated air-dry weight in 1,000 tons.)



Export of Woodgoods.

(1,000 m³.)



Export of Products of the Engineering Works.

(Mill. kr.)



Import of Coal and Coke.

(1,000 tons.)

Everywhere except in the first diagram the dotted line indicates the original figures and the solid line the moving 12 months' averages.

Share Index.	1936	1937									1938						
	Jan.	Jan.	April	June	July	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	1 April	April	May	1 June
Home industry	138	157	160	155	157	161	157	152	153	154	158	160	155	149	152	157	156
Other industry	134	186	200	183	189	194	181	164	166	168	172	172	167	155	161	164	159
Of which																	
Grängesberg	78	177	238	215	234	242	218	182	195	209	219	209	197	178	188	186	182
Exporting engineering industry	167	223	225	211	212	217	208	192	187	192	196	189	187	181	186	194	185
Other, including iron and steel ind.	148	196	201	182	189	194	177	166	168	168	173	176	172	152	161	161	157
Wood-goods and pulp-ind.	108	146	157	142	147	154	143	129	131	127	131	133	128	118	120	123	120
Mixed wood and iron ind.	143	186	211	188	198	200	180	170	176	174	176	188	187	172	182	182	174
Banks	168	189	190	180	187	188	184	176	179	182	191	189	181	173	176	177	177

Note. Where not otherwise stated, the figures are for the middle of the month.

The Bond Market. The following table gives approximative figures for the yield (in percentage) corresponding to the market value of representative Swedish bonds during the last few months.

Swedish Government.	Number of loans	1937 $^{14}/_{12}$	1938 $^{14}/_{1}$	$^{15}/_{2}$	$^{15}/_{3}$	$^{12}/_{4}$	$^{17}/_{5}$	$^{31}/_{5}$
3 % 1934 Conv. 1944	1	2.98	2.75	2.25	2.27	2.49	2.33	2.24
3 % 1937 Conv. 1947	1	2.86	2.70	2.49	2.42	2.53	2.44	2.41
Mortgage Banks.								
3 % Conv. 1944—47	4	2.91	2.76	2.44	2.36	2.46	2.38	2.38
Municipalities.								
3, $3^{1}/_{4}$ and 4 % Conv. 1943—46	3	2.88	2.84	2.77	2.63	2.66	2.65	2.64
Industrial Companies.								
$3^{1}/_{4}$ % Conv. 1947	3	3.05	2.97	2.97	2.91	3.00	2.98	2.87
$3^{1}/_{2}$ % » 1947	1	3.15	3.03	3.02	2.93	2.94	2.93	2.86
4 % » 1945	1	3.22	3.18	3.18	3.16	3.24	3.20	3.07

In the case of bond prices also there was a general decline in the latter half of March, owing to the political complications in Europe. Prices subsequently recovered in consequence of the great shortage of material for new investments. It is significant that in April and May not a single bond loan was issued for public subscription except for the purpose of converting previous loans. It was for this purpose that a $3^{1}/_{4}$ per cent. loan of 14 million kronor was raised at a price of $99^{1}/_{2}$ per cent. on the Swedish market by the Norwegian Municipal Bank, with the guarantee of the Norwegian Government. In addition, the 5 per cent. bond loans of 1929 issued by Mo och Domsjö AB. and Korsnäs Sågverks AB., the unredeemed amounts of which were 3,272,000 and 7,824,000 kronor respectively, have been called in for redemption, with an offer of the prolongation of the loans against reduction of the interest to 3 per cent. Stadshypotekskassan (Swedish Cities' Mortgage Bank), however, has been able at the same price as before to increase the private sale of its $2^{1}/_{2}$ and 3 per cent. bonds, whilst the City of Stockholm has borrowed at about $2^{3}/_{4}$ per cent, a sum of 25 million kronor from the Pensions Board and other institutions as well as 10 million kronor from a syndicate of insurance companies. As is shown by the table above referred to, the lack of material for investment on the open bond market has resulted in prices corresponding to a yield of $2^{1}/_{3}$—$2^{2}/_{3}$ per cent. for gilt-edged securities and of about 3 per cent. for $3^{1}/_{4}$ to 4 per cent. industrial loans. In estimating these yields, the risk of conversion has been taken into account. As will be seen from the above, also 3 per cent. industrial loans have begun to appear on the market. Under prevailing conditions it is scarcely surprising that little business has been done in bonds, and that the market has been rather dull.

Some Statistical Data Concerning

Currency Reserve, Stock of Gold, Note Circulation.

	Net Claims of Banks on Abroad million kronor (End of month)									The Riksbank's								
	Riksbank			Commercial banks[1]			Total[1]			Stock of Gold (million kr.)			Stock of Gold and Net Claims on Abroad (million kr.)			Note Circulation (million kr.)		
	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938
Jan.	598	734	972	197	74	−55	795	808	917	429	529	540	1027	1263	1512	702	804	880
Feb.	593	818	921	181	− 41	−38	774	777	883	440	530	557	1033	1348	1478	712	797	870
March	575	831	866	173	− 78	−19	748	753	847	454	531	575	1029	1362	1441	741	826	898
I (Average)	**589**	**794**	**920**	**184**	**− 15**	**−37**	**773**	**779**	**882**	**441**	**530**	**557**	**1030**	**1324**	**1477**	**718**	**809**	**883**
April	544	827	851	188	− 91	−24	732	736	827	461	532	576	1005	1359	1427	744	812	908
May	506	874	827	191	−118		697	756		484	533	600	990	1407	1427	728	800	
June	496	907		209	−149		705	758		509	534		1005	1441		755	826	
II (Average)	**515**	**869**		**196**	**−119**		**711**	**750**		**485**	**533**		**1000**	**1402**		**742**	**813**	
July	518	921		189	−138		707	783		510	535		1028	1456		739	818	
Aug.	533	960		207	−120		740	840		511	536		1044	1496		756	839	
Sept.	556	1014		211	−153		767	861		526	536		1082	1550		789	875	
III (Average)	**536**	**965**		**202**	**−137**		**738**	**828**		**516**	**536**		**1051**	**1501**		**761**	**844**	
Oct.	604	1027		165	−122		769	905		526	537		1130	1564		796	865	
Nov.	652	1030		151	−112		803	918		528	538		1180	1568		785	868	
Dec.	717	984		137	− 46		854	938		529	539		1246	1522		845	927	
IV (Average)	**658**	**1013**		**151**	**− 93**		**809**	**920**		**528**	**538**		**1185**	**1551**		**809**	**887**	
Notes	The figures comprise balances with foreign customers and holdings of foreign bills and foreign bonds less amounts due to foreign customers.									At end of month. Gold stock and currencies partly booked below market values.						Monthly averages		

[1] The figures have been revised to comprise also other foreign customers than banks and bankers.

Rates of Exchange.

	Nominal Quotations of the Commercial Banks (Monthly Averages)											
	London Kr. for £ 1			New York Kr. for $ 1			Paris Kr. for 100 francs			Berlin Kr. for 100 Rmk		
	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938
Jan.	19.402	19.400	19.405	3.918	3.961	3.885	25.974	18.500	13.085	158.630	159.521	156.948
Feb.	19.400	19.400	19.411	3.888	3.970	3.872	25.990	18.504	12.810	158.550	160.000	157.008
March	19.401	19.400	19.420	3.910	3.980	3.900	25.960	18.324	12.315	158.330	160.380	157.294
I (Average)	**19.401**	**19.400**	**19.412**	**3.905**	**3.970**	**3.886**	**25.975**	**18.443**	**12.737**	**158.503**	**159.967**	**157.083**
April	19.403	19.408	19.410	3.931	3.954	3.903	25.928	17.838	12.200	158.370	159.433	157.261
May	19.400	19.402	19.403	3.908	3.935	3.909	25.764	17.654	[3] 11.034	157.860	158.333	157.432
June	19.400	19.400		3.871	3.939		25.533	[2] 17.566		156.261	158.083	
II (Average)	**19.401**	**19.403**		**3.903**	**3.943**		**25.742**	**[2] 17.686**		**157.497**	**158.616**	
July	19.400	19.402		3.869	3.913		25.646	15.026		156.297	157.620	
Aug.	19.400	19.400		3.867	3.901		25.485	14.700		155.702	157.298	
Sept.	19.400	19.400		3.856	3.924		[1] 25.343	13.983		155.120	157.654	
III (Average)	**19.400**	**19.401**		**3.864**	**3.913**		**[1] 25.491**	**14.570**		**155.706**	**157.524**	
Oct.	19.400	19.400		3.965	3.921		18.542	13.237		159.741	157.789	
Nov.	19.400	19.403		3.975	3.891		18.510	13.250		160.370	157.344	
Dec.	19.400	19.406		3.961	3.887		18.500	13.250		159.792	157.074	
IV (Average)	**19.400**	**19.403**		**3.967**	**3.900**		**18.517**	**13.246**		**159.968**	**157.402**	

[1] Up to September 25th 1936, inclusive. — [2] Up to June 28th 1937, inclusive. — [3] From May 5th, inclusive.

Sweden's Economic Position.

Commercial Banks, Stock Exchange.

	Commercial banks									Share Quotations						Shares sold on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (1000 kr.)		
	Deposits[1] (million kr.)			Loans[1] incl. bills rediscounted (million kr.)			Cash (million kr.)			Home Industry			Other Industry					
	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938
Jan.	3578	3758	3823	3696	3814	3974	376	598	679	138	157	158	134	186	172	927	1361	1357
Feb.	3564	3807	3822	3733	3847	4012	348	702	613	144	158	160	137	195	172	583	1930	926
March	3602	3871	3868	3767	3896	4058	280	756	588	145	160	155	143	198	167	531	2439	1063
I (Average)	**3581**	**3812**	**3838**	**3732**	**3852**	**4015**	**335**	**685**	**627**	**142**	**158**	**158**	**138**	**193**	**170**	**680**	**1910**	**1115**
April	3587	3850	3844	3804	3919	4095	280	727	574	158	160	152	152	200	161	441	1950	950
May	3519	3850		3791	3922		208	728		143	154	157	154	183	164	618	1350	559
June	3548	3825		3762	3939		281	732		141	155		152	182		834	1329	
II (Average)	**3551**	**3842**		**3786**	**3927**		**256**	**729**		**147**	**156**		**153**	**188**		**631**	**1543**	
July	3600	3907		3751	3915		383	809		144	157		166	189		635	2087	
Aug.	3628	3934		3753	3931		417	840		146	161		166	194		873	1340	
Sept.	3699	3964		3785	3967		452	858		145	157		159	181		518	1154	
III (Average)	**3642**	**3935**		**3763**	**3938**		**417**	**836**		**145**	**158**		**164**	**188**		**675**	**1527**	
Oct.	3690	4000		3796	3990		503	876		149	152		168	164		644	1561	
Nov.	3615	3841		3824	4013		405	687		158	153		178	166		541	2082	
Dec.	3659	3779		3838	4001		465	606		156	154		180	168		726	1801	
IV (Average)	**3655**	**3873**		**3819**	**4001**		**458**	**723**		**154**	**153**		**175**	**166**		**637**	**1815**	
Notes	Deposits from and loans to the public within the country (at the end of the respective month)						Cash in hand, credit balances on cheque accounts with the Riksbank et cetera			The figures denote mid-monthly average prices.						Averages per Stock Exchange business day		

[1] Revised figures.

Rates of Interest and Price Level.

	Rediscount Rate of the Riksbank (%)			Yield of Bonds (%)						Wholesale Price Index (Board of Trade) (1913 = 100)						Cost of Living Index (July 1914 = 100)		
				Govt. Loans			Industrial Loans			All Goods			Raw Materials					
	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938
Jan.	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.29	3.05	2.75	3.72	·	2.97	118	129	135	115	127	132	158	158	165
Feb.	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.25	3.03	2.25	3.62	3.04	2.97	118	132	134	115	129	130	·	·	·
March	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.25	3.05	2.27	3.55	3.22	2.91	118	136	132	115	131	128	·	·	·
I (Average)	**2.00**	**2.00**	**2.00**	**3.26**	**3.04**	**2.42**	**3.63**	·	**2.95**	**118**	**132**	**134**	**115**	**129**	**130**			
April	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.15	3.12	2.49	3.50	3.28	3.00	118	138	131	114	132	126	158	161	165
May	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.17	3.13	2.33	3.43	3.25	2.98	118	139		113	134		·	·	
June	2.00	2.00		3.17	3.07		3.43	3.25		118	139		113	135		·	·	
II (Average)	**2.00**	**2.00**		**3.16**	**3.11**		**3.45**	**3.26**		**118**	**139**		**113**	**134**				
July	2.00	2.00		3.18	3.08		3.29	3.25		119	140		114	135		158	162	
Aug.	2.00	2.00		3.12	3.06		3.31	3.24		120	140		116	136		·	·	
Sept.	2.00	2.00		3.06	3.05		3.27	3.19		122	140		118	137		·	·	
III (Average)	**2.00**	**2.00**		**3.12**	**3.06**		**3.29**	**3.23**		**120**	**140**		**116**	**136**				
Oct.	2.00	2.00		3.08	3.05		3.34	3.18		123	139		120	135		157	165	
Nov.	2.00	2.00		3.06	3.03		3.24	3.16		124	137		121	133		·	·	
Dec.	2.00	2.00		3.05	2.98		3.15	3.05		126	136		124	134		·	·	
IV (Average)	**2.00**	**2.00**		**3.06**	**3.02**		**3.25**	**3.13**		**124**	**137**		**122**	**134**				
Notes	Monthly averages			Calculated on market prices at middle of months						Calculated on prices ruling at middle of months						Refers to end of quarters		

Trade and Industry.

	Foreign Trade (million kr.)									Export of Forest Products								
	Import			Export			Excess of Imports (−) or Exports (+)			Sawn and Planed Wood Goods 1000 stds			Paper Pulp 1000 tons			Paper and Pasteboard 1000 tons		
	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938
Jan.	134	142	159	106	123	145	−28	−19	−14	46	30	25	176.0	205.5	182.6	52.5	51.2	46.3
Feb.	115	133	147	91	115	134	−24	−18	−13	11	8	8	95.9	102.5	79.8	47.6	50.7	35.5
March	126	160	173	94	114	133	−32	−46	−40	12	10	12	47.2	60.2	65.1	54.8	56.6	39.4
I (Average)	**125**	**145**	**160**	**97**	**117**	**137**	**−28**	**−28**	**−23**	**23**	**16**	**15**	**106.4**	**122.7**	**109.2**	**51.6**	**52.8**	**40.4**
April	130	199	167	112	149	157	−18	−50	−10	15	16	22	206.3	190.1	174.4	51.0	62.2	35.1
May	130	184		129	171		− 1	−13		64	58		233.4	294.0		48.4	52.0	
June	121	179		126	169		+ 5	−10		103	104		202.8	239.4		41.1	53.4	
II (Average)	**127**	**187**		**122**	**163**		**− 5**	**−24**		**61**	**59**		**214.2**	**241.2**		**46.8**	**55.6**	
July	132	185		132	190		0	+ 5		91	113		217.1	271.9		46.6	51.9	
Aug.	126	171		136	187		+10	+16		96	103		198.9	237.7		56.1	60.3	
Sept.	142	187		140	197		− 2	+10		93	99		216.8	241.6		47.1	56.5	
III (Average)	**133**	**181**		**136**	**191**		**+ 3**	**+10**		**93**	**105**		**210.9**	**250.4**		**49.9**	**56.1**	
Oct.	160	192		145	195		−15	+ 3		95	96		172.8	238.6		56.0	58.9	
Nov.	154	193		151	186		− 3	− 7		100	91		230.6	213.4		54.9	54.5	
Dec.	150	184		144	198		− 6	+14		70	67		263.0	275.7		49.8	55.7	
IV (Average)	**155**	**190**		**147**	**193**		**− 8**	**+ 3**		**88**	**85**		**222.1**	**242.6**		**53.6**	**56.4**	
Notes										Petersburg standard = 4.67 m³			Estimated air-dry weight					

	Export of Iron Ore 1000 tons			Export of Workshop Products million kr.			Index of Production according to Feder. of Swed. Industries (1935 = 100)			Supply of Industrial Work Index numbers			Waggon-axle Kilometres of loaded Trucks on State Railways			Unemployment in Trade Unions (%)		
	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1939	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938	1936	1937	1938
Jan.	659	696	928	6.88	8.14	8.43	103	113	119	·	·	·	34.4	37.8	41.1	19.0	16.2	15.6
Feb.	686	786	850	6.93	7.58	9.42	104	114	119	·	·	·	37.0	41.3	42.5	18.0	14.8	14.5
March	751	958	892	8.26	8.85	9.78	105	116	118	·	·	·	39.8	43.3	47.9	16.5	14.3	12.7
I (Average)	**699**	**813**	**890**	**7.36**	**8.19**	**9.21**	**104**	**114**	**119**	**3.71**	**4.01**	**3.45**	**37.1**	**40.8**	**43.8**	**17.8**	**15.1**	**14.3**
April	748	980	1014	7.59	9.52	10.42	106	118	118	·	·		39.6	47.6		13.8	11.1	
May	744	835	1133	8.12	8.30		107	119		·	·		41.7	43.3		10.2	8.3	
June	948	1098		7.07	9.40		107	120		·	·		37.4	42.4		9.3	7.7	
II (Average)	**813**	**971**		**7.93**	**9.07**		**107**	**119**		**3.82**	**4.10**		**39.6**	**44.4**		**11.1**	**9.0**	
July	905	1228		7.33	9.24		107	120		·	·		42.2	46.1		8.1	6.4	
Aug.	751	1231		7.36	9.22		109	121		·	·		43.0	46.3		8.0	6.2	
Sept.	861	1134		7.48	9.88		111	122		·	·		45.6	48.4		8.6	6.8	
III (Average)	**839**	**1198**		**7.39**	**9.45**		**109**	**121**		**3.91**	**4.06**		**43.6**	**46.9**		**8.2**	**6.5**	
Oct.	902	987		9.09	9.65		112	123		·	·		44.7	48.5		10.3	8.3	
Nov.	806	1062		8.26	8.89		113	123		·	·		40.1	43.8		12.3	11.1	
Dec.	632	989		7.32	10.20		114	122		·	·		39.7	44.6		17.5	17.8	
IV (Average)	**780**	**1013**		**8.22**	**9.58**		**113**	**123**		**3.97**	**3.80**		**41.5**	**45.6**		**13.4**	**12.4**	
Notes	Shipments of the Grängesberg Co.			Motors, electr. machinery, ball bearings, separators, telephones, etc.			Seasonal change removed			The figure 3 denotes normal supply of work			Million kilom. per month			% of total members at end of month		

Stockholm 1938. Kgl. Boktr. P. A. Norstedt & Söner 382025

Quotations of Swedish Bonds. — *Kursnotierungen für schwedische Obligationen.*

In percentage; ex interest. — *In %, exclusive Zinsen.*

June 1938
Juni 1938

Quoted on the Stock Exchange	Terms of Redemption *Tilgungsmodalitäten* D = Drawings *Auslosung* P = Purchase *Rückkauf* R = Perpetual Loan *Staatsrente*	Redeemable in Whole *Konvertibel*	Interest Dates *Zinstermine* *	Prices (bid) *Notierungen (Geld)* 1938 25/2	29/3	29/4	31/5	10/6
Swedish Government 2½ % 1935	Maturity *Rückzahlung* 1947		15/4—15/10	103½	—	105	104½	104½
» 3 » 1934	R	30/12 1944	30/6—30/12	104½	104	103¾	104¾	105
» 3 » 1937 Febr.	1938—1997 D P	1/2 1947	1/2— 1/8	104¾	104	104	104¾	105
» 3 » 1937 March	1938—1997 D P	1/3 1947	1/3— 1/9	104¾	104½	104	104¾	105
» 3½ » 1933	R	1/11 1943	1/5— 1/11	107½	107¼	107	107¾	107¾
» 3½ » 1934	1945—1974 D	1/10 1944	1/4— 1/10	108	107½	108	108¼	108¼
» 4 » 1931	1932—1981 D P¹	15/5 1941	15/5—15/11	107	106	106¼	107	106¾
» 4 » 1933	R	15/3 1943	15/3—15/9	110¾	110	110	110¼	110¼
» 4 » 1933	R	1/10 1943	1/4— 1/10	110¾	110	110	110½	110½
» 4 » 1933	1934—1958 D P²	15/10 1944	15/4—15/10	110¾	110	110	110¼	110
» 4½ » 1929	R	15/12 1939	15/6—15/12	105¾	105½	105	105¼	105¼
» 4½ » 1930	R	15/9 1940	15/3—15/9	108	107¾	107	107	107¼
» 4½ » 1932	R	15/4 1942	15/4—15/10	111¾	111¾	111	110½	110¼
Sveriges Allm. Hypoteksbank . . . . . 3 % 1935	1945—2005 D P	30/3 1945	30/3—30/9	104¾	104	—	104¼	104¼
(Royal Swedish Mortgage Bank) 3 » 1935 II	1945—1964 D 1965—2005 D P	30/9 1945	30/6—30/9	104¾	104	—	104¼	—
» » 3 » 1937	1947—1999 D P	1/6 1947	1/6— 1/12	104½	104	104	104½	104¾
» » 3½ » 1935	1945—2000 D	30/12 1945	30/6—30/12	—	107	—	—	107¾
» » 3¾ » 1934	1935—1994 D P	15/7 1994	15/1—15/7	108	108	108	108	107½
» » 4 » 1878	1884—1959 D P		30/6—31/12	110½	110½	—	110¾	111
» » 4 » 1879	1880—1/81939 D		1/2— 1/8	102	102	101	101¼	101¼
	Twice a year. *Zweimal jährlich.*							
» » 4 » 1931	1932—1991 D P	15/6 1941	15/6—15/12	107	106	106	107	107
» » 4 » 1933	1943—2003 D P	1/12 1943	1/6— 1/12	109	108	109	109	109
» » 4½ » 1929	1949—2009 D P	15/10 1939	5/4—15/10	105¼	105	104½	104¾	104¾
» » 4½ » 1931	1951—2011 D P	1/6 1941	21/6— 1/12	110¼	110½	110½	110	110
Kon. Sveriges Stadshypotekskassa . . 3 » 1934	1944—2008 D P	1/5 1944	1/5— 1/11	104	103	103½	104	104
(Swedish Cities' Mortgage Bank) 3 » 1935	1945—2009 D P	15/3 1945	15/3—15/9	104½	—	103¾	104½	104½
» » 3 » 1937	1947—2002 D P	1/3 1947	1/3— 1/9	—	—	—	104½	104¾
» » 3¼ » 1937	1947—2006 D P	1/3 1947	1/3— 1/9	105	105	105	105¾	105¾
» » 3½ » 1933	1943—2002 D P	15/6 1943	15/6—15/12	107	106½	107	107	107¼
» » 3½ » 1935	1945—2004 D P	15/1 1945	15/1—15/7	107¾	107¼	107¾	108	107¾
» » 3½ » 1936	1946—2005 D P	15/3 1946	15/3—15/9	108	107	107¾	108	108
» » 4 » 1931	1941—2000 D P	1/2 1941	1/2— 1/8	107¾	107	106¾	107	107
» » 4 » 1934	1944—2003 D P	15/1 1944	15/1—15/7	110¾	110	111½	111	110¾
» » 4½ » 1930	1940—1989 D P	1/6 1940	1/6— 1/12	108½	107	107	107¼	107½
» » 4½ » 1932	1942—1991 D P	1/1 1942	1/2— 1/8	112½	112	111¼	111	111
» » 4½ » 1933	1943—1992 D P	1/4 1943	1/4— 1/10	113½	114	114¼	113½	113½
» » 5 » 1931	1941—1990 D P	1941	15/2—15/8	111¼	110	110½	110	110
Svenska Bostadskreditkassan³ . . . . 3¼ » 1937	1947—1977 D P	15/7 1947	15/1—15/7	104	103½	103¼	104	104
» » 3½ » 1934	1944—1974 D P	15/10 1944	15/4—15/10	—	—	—	—	—
» » 5 » 1930	1940—1970 D P	15/7 1940	15/1—15/7	107¾	107½	—	107¼	107¼
» » 5 » 1932	1942—1972 D P	15/1 1942	15/1—15/7	—	110½	110½	110¼	110½
Svenska Skeppshypotekskassan⁴ (No. 1) 5 » 1930	Maturity *Rückzahlung* 1/3 1950	1/3 1940	1/3— 1/9	107	107	106¾	106½	106½
» (No. 2) 5 » 1931	» » 1/12 1951	1/12 1941	1/6— 1/12	108½	108	107½	107½	107½
Sthlms Int. Gar. A.-B. (The Mortgage Bank of Stockholm Ltd) 3 » 1934	1944—1993 D P	1/12 1944	1/6— 1/12	—	104	—	—	104
» » 4½ » 1931	1941—1990 D P	15/1 1941	15/1—15/7	—	107	—	107	107
Sv. Obligationskredit A.-B.⁵ Ser. II 4½ » 1923	1924—1965 D P	1/10 1939	1/4— 1/10	103¾	100	—	100	100
» » IV 6½ » 1924	1925—1949 D P	1934	15/4—15/10	100½	95	95	—	88
» » V 6 » 1930	1932—1957 D P	1935	2/1— 1/7	100	—	83	—	75
» » VI 6 » 1930	1931—1968 D P	1/12 1940	1/6—1/12	99½	—	90	88	87
» » VII 4½ » 1935	1939—1/12 1959 D P	1/12 1944	1/6— 1/12	104	—	—	76	77
City of Stockholm 3 » 1925	1926—1965 D P	15/3 1945	15/9— 15/9	—	103	103¾	103½	103
» » 3¾ » 1936	1937—1966 D P	2/1 1946	1/5— 1/11	104¼	104½	—	104	104¼
» » 4½ » 1931	1932—1971 D P	15/5 1941	15/5—15/11	106¼	105¾	106	106	106¼
» » Conv. 5 » 1918	1919—1958 D P	15/10 1938	15/4—15/10	102¾	102¼	—	101½	101¼
» » » 5 » 1918	1919—1958 D P	15/3 1939	15/3—15/9	102¾	102½	101¾	—	103
» » 5 » 1932	1933—1962 D P	15/3 1942	15/3—15/9	—	109	—	108½	108½
City of Gothenburg 4 » 1906	1907—1946 D P	1916	15/4—15/10	—	101	—	101	101
» » Conv. 4 » 1922	1923—1956 D P	31/12 1943	30/6—31/12	—	105½	—	—	105½

An der Börse eingeführt

Schwedischer Staat	2½ % 1935	
»	3 » 1934	
»	3 » 1937 Febr.	
»	3 » 1937 März	
»	3½ » 1933	
»	3½ » 1934	
»	4 » 1931	
»	4 » 1933	
»	4 » 1933	
»	4 » 1933	
»	4½ » 1929	
»	4½ » 1930	
»	4½ » 1932	
Sveriges Allm. Hypoteksbank	3 % 1935	
(*Schwed. Reichs-Hypothekenbank*)	3 » 1935 II	
» »	3 » 1937	
» »	3½ » 1935	
» »	3¾ » 1934	
» »	4 » 1878	
» »	4 » 1879	
» »	4 » 1931	
» »	4 » 1933	
» »	4½ » 1929	
» »	4½ » 1931	
Kon. Sveriges Stadshypotekskassa . .	3 » 1934	
(*Stadthypothekenkasse Schwedens*)	3 » 1935	
	3 » 1937	
» »	3½ » 1937	
» »	3½ » 1933	
» »	3½ » 1935	
» »	3½ » 1936	
» »	4 » 1931	
» »	4 » 1934	
» »	4½ » 1930	
» »	4½ » 1932	
» »	4½ » 1933	
» »	5 » 1931	
Svenska Bostadskreditkassan³	3¼ » 1937	
» »	3½ » 1934	
» »	5 » 1930	
» »	5 » 1932	
Svenska Skeppshypotekskassan⁴ (No. 1)	5 » 1930	
» (No. 2)	5 » 1931	
Sthlms Int. Gar. A.-B. (*Stockholmer Hypotheken-Garantie A. G.*)	3 » 1934	
» »	4½ » 1931	
Sv. Obligationskredit A.-B.⁵ Ser.	II 4½ » 1923	
» »	IV 6½ » 1924	
» »	V 6 » 1930	
» »	VI 6 » 1930	
» »	VII 4½ » 1935	
Stadt Stockholm	3 » 1925	
» »	3¾ » 1936	
» »	4½ » 1931	
» » *Konv.*	5 » 1918	
» » »	5 » 1918	
» »	5 » 1932	
Stadt Gotenburg	4 » 1906	
» » *Konv.*	4 » 1922	

¹ After 15/5 1941. — *Vom 15/5 1941 an.*

² After 15/4 1944. — *Vom 15/4 1944 an.*

³ The Residential Mortgage Bank of Sweden, founded in 1929, is the central organization of a number of local credit associations having for object to grant loans to their members against mortgages on houses. It has a guaranty fund of 30 mill. Kr. in 4½ % Government bonds placed at its disposal by the Government. — *Schwedische Wohnungshypothekenbank-Kasse, die im Jahre 1929 gegründet wurde, ist das Zentralinstitut einer Anzahl lokaler Kreditkassen, die den Zweck haben, an ihre Mitglieder Anleihen gegen Haushypotheken zu bewilligen. Die Bank hat einen Garantiefonds von 30 Mill. Kr. in 4½ % Schwed. Staatsobligationen, die vom Staate zu ihrer Verfügung gestellt wurden.*

⁴ The Swedish Ship Mortgage Bank, founded in 1929, has for object to grant loans against mortgages on Swedish ships. As a guaranty fund for the Bank the Government has placed at its disposal Swedish Government bonds for 10 mill. Kr. — *Die Bank der Schwedischen Schiffshypotheken-Kasse, die im Jahre 1929 gegründet wurde, ist gegen Sicherheit von Hypotheken auf schwedische Schiffe Anleihen zu gewähren. Als Grundfonds für die Kasse stellt der Staat schwedische Staatsobligationen im Betrage von 10 Mill. Kr. zur Verfügung.*

⁵ The Svenska Obligationskredit A.-B. is a joint stock company established by four leading Swedish banks for the purpose of negotiating credits preferably with foreign countries. Its share capital amounts to Kr. 10 000 000. The series II is covered by 6 % Finnish Gov. bonds of 1924, the series IV by 7 % German Govt. bonds of 1924, the series V by 7 % Austrian Govt. bonds of 1930, the series VI by 6 % Greek Govt. bonds of 1931 and the series VII by 4½ % Austrian Govt. bonds of 1935. — *Die Svenska Obligationskredit A.-B. ist eine von vier führenden Schwedischen gegründete Aktiengesellschaft, welche die Vermittlung von Krediten vorzugsweise mit dem Auslande bezweckt. Das Aktienkapital beträgt Kr. 10 000 000. Die Sicherheit für Serie II besteht aus 6 % Obl. des Finnl. Staates von 1924, für Serie IV aus 7 % Obl. des Deutschen Reichs von 1924, für Serie V aus 7 % Obl. des Österreichischen Staates von 1930, für Serie VI aus 6 % Obl. des Griechischen Staates von 1931 und für Serie VII aus 4½ % Obl. des Österreichischen Staates von 1935.*

* **Amortization-dates underlined.** — ***Tilgungstermine unterstrichen.***

Quoted on the Stock Exchange	Terms of Redemption *Tilgungsmodalitäten* D = Drawings *Auslosung* P = Purchase *Rückkauf* R = Perpetual Loan *Staatsrente*	Redeemable in Whole *Konvertibel*	Interest Dates *Zinstermine* *	Prices (bid) *Notierungen (Geld)* 1938 25/2	29/3	29/4	31/5	10/6	An der Börse eingeführt
Bergslagernas Järnvägs A.-B. (Railway) 4 % 1898 conv.	1912—1961 D at 110 % *zu 110 %*		15/1—15/7	—	111	—	110½	110	Bergslagernas Järnvägs A.-B. (*Eisenbahn*) 4 % 1898 *konv.*
Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund (Iron Ore) 4 » 1922	1927—1944 D	1/4 1932	1/4—1/10	—	106	—	106	106	Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund (*Eisenerz*) 4 » 1922
» » 4½ » 1930	1935—1960 D	15/11 1940	15/5—15/11	—	106	—	106	106	» » 4½ » 1930
» » 5½ » 1932	1937—1952 D	1/5 1942	1/5—1/11	—	112	112¾	112½	112	» » 5½ » 1932
Hellefors Bruks A.-B. (Wood & Iron Products) 4 » 1935	1940—1960 D	15/9 1945	15/3—15/9	—	104¼	—	—	105	Hellefors Bruks A.-B. (*Eisen u. Holzwaren*) 4 » 1935
Holmens Bruks & Fabriks A.-B. (Pulp, Paper & Cotton Goods) 4 » 1935	1941—1960 D	15/10 1945	15/4—15/10	—	104¾	—	105	105¼	Holmens Bruks & Fabriks A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Baumwollwaren*) 4 » 1935
Krångede A.-B. (Power Co.) 3½ » 1936	1942—1966 D	15/5 1946	15/5—15/11	—	104	—	—	105½	Krångede A.-B. (Elektrisches Kraftwerk 3½ » 1936
Luossavaara—Kiirunavaara A.-B. (Iron Ore) 4½ » 1930[1]	1931—1955 D	15/4 1940	15/4—15/10	—	105	—	104½	—	Luossavaara—Kiirunavaara A.-B. (*Eisenerz*) 4½ » 1930[1]
Marma-Långrörs A.-B. (Pulp and Timber) 4 » 1935	1940—1955 D	1/10 1945	1/4—1/10	—	104½	—	105¼	105	Marma-Långrörs A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*) 4 » 1935
Svenska Sockerfabriks A.-B. (Sugar) 3¼ » 1936	1937—1951 D	1/10 1946	1/4—1/10	103	103	103½	104½	104	Svenska Sockerfabriks A.-B. (Zucker) 3¼ » 1936
Uddeholms A.-B. (Wood and Iron products) 4½ » 1930	1940—1970 D	1/12 1940	1/6—1/12	—	106½	—	106	106½	Uddeholms A.-B. (*Eisen u. Holzwaren*) 4½ » 1930
» » 5 » 1921 conv.	1931—1953 D	15/3 1939	15/3—15/9	103¾	103½	—	103½	103½	» » 5 » 1921 *konv.*

Not quoted on the Stock Exchange				Approximate Prices (bid) *Approx. Kurse (Geld)*					An der Börse nicht eingeführt
A. B. Bofors (War Material) 3¼ % 1937	1941—1957 D	15/5 1947	15/5—15/11	102½	102½	102½	103¾	103¾	A. B. Borors (*Kriegsmaterial*) 3¼ % 1937
Allmänna Svenska Elektriska A.-B. (ASEA) (Electrical Machinery) 5 % 1929	1930—1954 D	1/3 1939	1/3—1/9	103½	103½	103	102½	102¾	Allmänna Svenska Elektriska A.-B. (ASEA) (*Elektrische Maschinen*) 5 % 1929
Rederi A.-B. Svenska Lloyd (Shipping) 6½ % 1920 conv.	1928—1942 D		15/3—15/9	105	105	105	105	105	Rederi A.-B. Svenska Lloyd (*Reederei*) 6½ % 1920 *konv.*
Svenska Tändsticks A.-B. (Matches) 5 % 1931	1936—1956 D	2/1 1941	2/1—1/7	106¼	105	104½	105¾	106	Svenska Tändsticks A.-B. (*Zündhölzer*) 5 % 1931
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (Telephones), Registered certificates 5½ » 1931	1941—1951 D	15/6 1936[2]	15/6—15/12	104	—	104	104	104¾	Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (*Fernsprecher*), *Schuldverschreibungen* 5½ » 1931
Skandinaviska Kredit A.-B., Registered certificates 3½ » 1937	Maturity *Rückzahlung* 15/3 *1949*		1939[3]	—	103½	103	102¼	103	103	Skandinaviska Kredit A.-B., *Schuldverschreibungen* 3½ » 1937
International Match Realization Company, Voting Trust Certificates					$57	$50	$52½	$54½	$55	International Match Realization Company, *Voting Trust Zertifikate*
A.-B. Kreuger & Toll Bearer Certificates of Deposit 5 » 1929					31½	27½	28¼	26¾	26½	A.-B. Kreuger & Toll *Inhaber Zertifikate* 5 » 1929

[1] Guaranteed by the Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund. — *Mit Bürgschaft der Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund.* — [2] The company has the right to redeem the loan in 1936 at 105 %, in 1937 at 104 %, in 1938 at 103 %, in 1939 at 102 %, in 1940 at 101 %, in 1941 and thereafter at 100 %. — *Die Gesellschaft ist berechtigt, die Anleihe im Jahre 1936 zu 105 %, 1937 zu 104 %, 1938 zu 103 %, 1939 zu 102 %, 1940 zu 101 % und in folgenden Jahren zu 100 % einzulösen.* — [3] The Bank has the right to redeem the certificates, in whole or in part: 15/3 1939—14/3 1943 at 102 %, 15/3 1943—14/3 1945 at 101½ %, 15/3 1945—14/3 1947 at 101 % and 15/3 1947—14/3 1949 at 100½ %. — *Die Bank ist berechtigt, die Schuldverschreibungen 15/3 1939—14/3 1943 zu 102 %, 15/3 1943—14/3 1945 zu 101½ %, 15/3 1945—14/3 1947 zu 101 % und 15/3 1947—14/3 1949 zu 100½ % einzulösen.*

* **Amortization-dates underlined.** — *Tilgungstermine unterstrichen.*

Quotations of Foreign Bonds. — *Kursnotierungen für ausländische Obligationen.*

In percentage; ex interest. — *In %, exclusive Zinsen.*

Quoted on the Stock Exchange	Terms of Redemption *Tilgungsmodalitäten* D = Drawings *Auslosung* P = Purchase *Rückkauf* R = Perpetual Loan *Staatsrente*	Redeemable in Whole *Konvertibel*	Interest Dates *Zinstermine* *	Prices (bid) *Notierungen (Geld)* 1938 25/2	29/3	29/4	31/5	10/6	An der Börse eingeführt
Belgium, Kingdom of 4 % 1936	1937—1962 D P	1941—46 à 102 % 1946 à 100 %	1/5—1/11	100¾	—	97¾	98	98¼	*Belgischer Staat* 4 % 1936
Danish Government 4 » 1936	1937—1956 D	15/5 1946	15/5—15/11	106	104	104	103	103	*Dänischer Staat* 4 » 1936
» » 5 » 1928[2]	1933—1958 D P	15/3 1938	15/3—15/9	145¾	142	143½	144½	144	» » 5 » 1928[2]
Danish Mortgage Bank 4½ » 1931[3]	1936—1971 D P	15/3 1941	15/3—15/9	109	107	106	106½	106¾	*Dän. Hypothekenbank* 4½ » 1931[3]
Copenhagen, City of 4½ » 1930[4]	1931—1970 D P	1/12 1941	1/6—1/12	106¼	106	104	104½	104½	*Stadt Kopenhagen* 4½ » 1930[4]
Reykjavik, City of 4½ » 1935	1938—1960 D P	2/1 1945	2/1—1/7	103	102½	102¾	103	103½	*Stadt Revkjavik* 4½ » 1935
Finnish Government 4½ » 1934	1935—1944 D P	—	1/4—1/10	104½	104	104	104	104	*Finnl. Staat* 4½ » 1934
Finnish Mortgage Association 6½ » 1929[1]	1939—1950 D	1/6 1939	1/6—1/12	105¼	105¼	105¼	105¼	105¼	*Finnl. Bodenkreditanstalt* 6½ » 1929[1]
Norwegian Government 3½ » 1935	1936—1950 D	15/6 1940	15/6—15/12	103¾	102¾	102¾	102¾	102½	*Norwegischer Staat* 3½ » 1935
» » 3½ » 1936	1937—1951 D	15/1 1941	15/1—15/7	104	102¾	102¾	102¾	102¾	» » 3½ » 1936
Municipal Bank of Norway, 5½ % 1929[1] Ser. I	1932—1969 D P	1/9 1939	1/3—1/9	105½	105¼	105	105	105¼	*Norw. Kommunalbank* Ser I 5½ » 1929[1]
» » » 5½ » 1929[1] Ser. II	1932—1969 D P	1/10 1939	1/4—1/10	105½	105¼	105¼	105¼	105½	» » » II 5½ » 1929[1]
» » » 5 » 1930[1]	1935—1970 D P	1/6 1940	1/6—1/12	105½	104½	104½	104	104½	» » 5 » 1930[1]
» » » 4 » 1934[1]	1935—1954 D	1/12 1939	1/6—1/12	103½	102½	102½	103½	103½	» » 4 » 1934[1]
» » » 4 » 1935[1]	1936—1955 D	15/8 1940	15/2—15/8	103½	103	102¾	103½	103½	» » 4 » 1935[1]
Norwegian Hydro-Electric Nitrogen Co. 4 » 1937	1943—1987 D P	1/9 1943	1/3—1/9	—	—	—	104¼	104½	*Norsk Hydro-Elektrisk Kvaelstof A/S* 4 » 1937
Oslo, City of 4 » 1/8 1937	1937—1957 D P	1/8 1942	1/2—1/11	104¼	103½	103¾	104	104	*Stadt Oslo* 4 % 1/8 1937
» » » 4 » 15/11 1937	1940—1962 D P	15/11 1947	15/5—15/11	—	—	—	104½	104¾	» » 4 » 15/11 1937
German Govt. (Young-Loan) 5½ % 1930[5]	1931—1965 D P	1935	1/6—1/12	35	32½	33	32½	32	*Deutscher Staat (Young-Anleihe)* 5½ % 1930[5]
» Funding Bonds (Konversionskasse) Ser. I 4 » 1936[1]	1937—1946 D P	[6]	1/1—1/7	40½	40	41½	43¾	42¾	*Fundierungsanleihe der Deutschen Konversionskasse* Ser. I 4 » 1936[1]

[1] Guaranteed by the Government. — *Mit Bürgschaft des Staates.* — [2] Issued also for £, H.Fl. and D. Kr. — *Lauten auch auf £, H.Fl. und D. Kr* — [3] Issued also for £. — *Lauten auch auf £* — [4] [illegible] — [5] [illegible] — [6] At any time after three months' notice. — *Zu jeder Zeit nach 3 monatiger Kündigung.*

* **Amortization-dates underlined.** — *Tilgungstermine unterstrichen.*

Quotations of Swedish Shares. — *Kursnotierungen für schwedische Aktien.*

	Share Capital *Aktien-kapital*	Nom. Value *Nenn-wert*	Dividends *Dividende* [1]			Prices (bid) *Notierungen (Geld)* 1938				
			1936	1937	1938	28/2	31/3	30/4	31/5	10/6
Industrial and Miscellaneous Shares.	Mill.Kr.	Kr.	Kronor			Kronor				
A.-B. Atlas Diesel (Diesel Engines)	6.77	25	1	1.50	1.75	29	26.50	[2]26.50	25	25.50
» Bofors (War Materials)	24.75	100	11	11	11	211	183	193	[2]183	178
» De Lavals Ångturbin (Steam Turbines) Pref. shares	4.80	100	5	5	5	88	71	[2]74	71	67.50
» Elektrolux (Vacuum Cleaners, Refrigerators) Series A	4.50	75	[3]4+6	[3]5+5	[3]5+5	142	135	150	[2]146	144
» Elektrolux (Vacuum Cleaners, Refrigerators) » B	40.5	75	[3]4+6	[3]5+5	[3]5+5	140	126	145	[2]142	134
» Emissionsinstitutet (Holding Company)	2	100	7	9	10	[4]175	—	155	145	[4]157
» Investor (Holding Company)	28.80	500	30	30	35	670	590	[2]675	645	635
» » » » , free[6]	7.20	500	30	30	35	670	600	[2]580	660	665
» Klippans Finpappersbruk (Paper and Board)	7	100	8	9	9	220	191	210	[2]206	202
» Nordiska Armaturfabrikerna (Electrical Light Fittings)	8.25	50	2.50	2.50	2.75	43	42	[2]39	38	35.50
» Nordiska Kompaniet (Department Store) Pref. A	1.50	50	3	3	3	64	64	[2]64	—	—
» Nordiska Kompaniet (Department Store) Ord.	19	50	1.50	2	2.50	42.50	39	[2]38	36.50	36
» Pripp & Lyckholm (Brewery)	18	100	10	10	12	240	[2]230	243	243	245
» Separator (Milk Separators) Ord. A	42	100	5	6	8	104	101	106	[2]97	94.50
» Separator (Milk Separators) » B	39.7	100	5	6	8	104	102	106	[2]98	94.50
» Stockholms Bryggerier (Brewery)	29.6	100	15	15		359	325	354	358	351
» Svenska Kullager-fabriken (SKF) (Ball Bearings) Series A	37.99	50	10	10	10	203	181	199	[2]195	189
» Svenska Kullager-fabriken (SKF) (Ball Bearings) » B	25.92	50	10	10	10	280	254	273	[2]248	232
» Svenska Kullager-fabriken (SKF) (Ball Bearings) » B, stamped[5]	1.09	50	10	10	10	—	—	180	—	—
» Svenska Metallverken (Metal Products)	12.1	60	4.20	4.20	4.80	73	68	[2]67	65	63.50
» Sveriges förenade Tri-kåfabriker (Textiles) Pref.	3.50	100	10	10	12	210	—	[2]188	190	190
» Sveriges förenade Tri-kåfabriker (Textiles) Ord.	3.58	100	10	10	12	[4]230	[4]220	[2]194	183	183
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (Lithographical Printers) Pref.	12	100	7	7		151	140	[4]150	146	153
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (Lithographical Printers) Ord. A	16	100	6	6		120	101	107	110	107
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (Lithographical Printers) » A 1930	11	100	6	6		115	101	107	108	[4]110
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (Lithographical Printers) » B	4.4	100	4	6		98	89	90	93	92
» Turitz & Co. (Department Stores)	9	100	10	10	12	[2]230	205	220	218	225
» Volvo (Motorcars)	18.20	50	2.50	2.50	2.50	51	50.50	53	52	50
Allmänna Svenska Elektriska A.-B. (ASEA) (Electrical Machinery)	75	100	7	9	10	188	[2]152	166	164	163
Bergvik & Ala Nya A.-B. (Pulp and Timber)	28.12	180	12	13	15	265	225	250	[2]235	236
Billeruds A.-B. (Paper, Pulp and Timber)	28.2	100	6	6	8	121	106	[2]107	104	102
Bolidens Gruv A.-B. (Gold, Copper, etc.)[7]	42	50	10	7.50	7.50	135	125	[4]135	128	127
Finspongs Metallverks A.-B. (Metal Products)	7.68	80	4.80	4.80	4.80	85	[2]72.50	[4]80	78	75
» » » » » , free[6]	1.92	80	4.80	4.80	4.80	86	[2]73	78	80	78
Ford Motor Company A.-B	5	100	8	10	12	180	[2]158	162	162	[4]162
Holmens Bruks- & Fabriks A.-B. (Pulp, Paper, Wollen and Cotton Goods) Series A	21	100	5	6	6	110	[4]102	[2]95	95	95
Holmens Bruks- & Fabriks A.-B. (Pulp, Paper, Wollen and Cotton Goods) » B	13.56	100	5	6	6	108	—	[2]94	95	95.50
Höganäs-Billesholms A.-B. (Coal, Firebrick and Clay Goods)	30	100	5.50	6	7	135	[4]125	132	[2]132	135
Kopparfors A.-B. (Pulp and Timber)	20	100	5	6	6	113	94	[2]97	95.50	95
Korsnäs' Sågverks A.-B. (Paper, Pulp and Timber)	21	100	6	7	8	165	136	151	157	[2]142
Linoleum A.-B. Forshaga (Linoleum)	4	50	8.92	8.93	8.80	109	[4]105	[4]117	100	[4]105
Mexikanska Telefon A.-B. Ericsson (Telephone Service) Series A	5.4	180	—	—		52	—	44	38	38
Mexikanska Telefon A.-B. Ericsson (Telephone Service) » B	16.2	180	—	—		49	35	39.50	36	34
Mo och Domsjö A.-B. (Pulp and Timber) Series A	32	100	9	9	5	—	200	[2]185	185	185
Mo och Domsjö A.-B. (Pulp and Timber) » B		100	9	9	15	221	201	[2]182	189	185
Munksjö A.-B. (Paper, Pulp and Timber) Series A	10	100	—	3	13	79.50	61	68	65	65
Munksjö A.-B. (Paper, Pulp and Timber) » B	3.99	100	—	3	3	79	55.50	62.50	60	57
Munksjö A.-B. (Paper, Pulp and Timber) » B, free[7]	1	100	—	3	3	78	54	—	60	57
Sandvikens Jernverks A.-B. (Iron)	20	100	[3]3+5	[3]3+5	[3]3+5	180	145	[2]175	175	175
Skånska Cement A.-B. (Cement)	21	1 000	70	70	70	1575	—	—	[2]1530	1540
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags A.-B. (Paper, Pulp, Timber and Iron)	60	100	7	8	10	250	231	[2]245	241	241
Svenska Ackumulator A.-B. Jungner (Accumulators) Ord. A	2.16	100	8	8	8	140	125	[2]129	125	125
Svenska Ackumulator A.-B. Jungner (Accumulators) » B	2.01	100	8	8	8	140	122	[2]126	128	127
Svenska Ackumulator A.-B. Jungner (Accumulators) » B, stamped[5]	0.51	100	8	8	8	—	—	—	—	—
Svenska A.-B. Gasaccumulator (AGA) (Beacon Lighting etc.) Pref. shares	28.6	100	5	6	7	109	99.50	[2]100	96.50	96
Svenska Oljeslageri A.-B. (Vegetable Oils etc.)	3.6	100	8	8	[8]8	[4]210	[4]200	[2,4]195	[4]189	[4]189
Svenska Sockerfabriks A.-B. (Sugar)	81	60	3.50	3.50		83	80.50	83	82	83
Svenska Tändsticks A.-B. (Matches) Series A	22.50	25	—	—	—	24	21.75	23	22.50	22.50
Svenska Tändsticks A.-B. (Matches) » B	95	25	—	—	—	23.75	20.75	22.50	21	22
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (Telephones) Series A	28.23	50	—	—		29	27.50	29	28	27.50
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (Telephones) » B	42.35	50	—	—		29	27.50	28.50	28	27.50
Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund (Iron Ore)	119	100	3	6	8	211	[2]173	186	183	178
Uddeholms A.-B. (Pulp, Timber and Iron)	56	100	4.50	5.50		123	106	116	108	108
Wifstavarfs A.-B. (Pulp and Timber)	14.5	100	7	8	10	[4]196	161	[2]173	167	169
Railway and Shipping Shares.										
A.-B. Svenska Amerika Linien (Shipping)	24	100	—	3	4	70.50	[2]55	61.50	61.50	62
Bergslagernas Järnvägs A.-B. (Railway)	25.15	200	8	8	9	190	171	183	[2]176	180
Stockholms Rederi A.-B. Svea (Shipping)	17.64	30	1.75	1.75	2	36	[2]30	31.50	30	30
Insurance Shares.										
Brand- och Liffförsäkrings-A.-B. Svea	12	100	[3]6+9	[3]4+8	[3]4+8	201	[4]200	198	[2]200	200
Försäkrings-A.-B. Skandia	15	500	[3]20+10	[3]20+40	[3]20+40	1425	[4]1425	1400	1420	[2]1390
Bank Shares.										
A.-B. Göteborgs Bank Pref.	*48.12	125	6.25	6.25	6.25	[2]137	135	136	138	136
A.-B. Göteborgs Bank Ord.		125	3.75	5	6.25	[2]132	126	130	128	128
» Svenska Handelsbanken	*155	100	7	8	9	[2]184	166	179	178	177
Skandinaviska Kredit A.-B.	*102	142	8	8	8	203	[2]179	188	182	181
Stockholms Enskilda Bank A.-B.	*100	1 000	[3]50 +100	[3]50 +200	[3]50 +100	4060	[2]4100	4100	4100	4175
Stockholms Intecknings Garanti A.-B.	* 35	300	40	40	40	860	[4]865	[2]815	820	820
Sundsvalls Enskilda Bank A.-B.	* 32.5	100	[3]6+7	[3]6+9	[3]6+9	340	[2,4]340	315	330	330
Södermanlands Enskilda Bank A.-B.	* 14.60	100	5	5	5	112	[2]105	107	105	[4]106

Industrie- und diverse Aktien.										
A.-B. Atlas Diesel (*Dieselmotoren*)										
» Bofors (*Kriegsmaterial*)										
» De Lavals Ångturbin (*Dampfturbinen*) *Vorzugs-Aktien*										
» Elektrolux (*Staubsauger, Kühlschränke*) *Ser. A*										
» Elektrolux (*Staubsauger, Kühlschränke*) » *B*										
» Emissionsinstitutet (*Holdinggesellschaft*)										
» Investor (*Holdinggesellschaft*)										
» » » *, freie*[6]										
» Klippans Finpappersbruk (*Papier und Pappe*)										
» Nordiska Armaturfabrikerna (*Armaturen*)										
» Nordiska Kompaniet (*Warenhaus*) *Vorzugs-Aktien A*										
» Nordiska Kompaniet (*Warenhaus*) *Stamm-Aktien*										
» Pripp & Lyckholm (*Brauerei*)										
» Separator (*Separatoren*) *Stamm-Aktien A*										
» Separator (*Separatoren*) » *B*										
» Stockholms Bryggerier (*Brauerei*)										
» Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF) (*Kugellager*) *Ser. A*										
» Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF) (*Kugellager*) » *B*										
» Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF) (*Kugellager*) » *B, gestempelt*[5]										
» Svenska Metallverken (*Metallwaren*)										
» Sveriges förenade Trikåfabriker (*Textilwaren*) *Vorzugs-Aktien*										
» Sveriges förenade Trikåfabriker (*Textilwaren*) *Stamm-Aktien*										
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (*Lithographische Druckereien*) *Vorzugs-Aktien*										
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (*Lithographische Druckereien*) *Stamm-Aktien A*										
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (*Lithographische Druckereien*) » *A 1930*										
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (*Lithographische Druckereien*) » *B*										
» Turitz & Co. (*Warenhäuser*)										
» Volvo (*Automobile*)										
Allmänna Svenska Elektriska A.-B. (ASEA) (*Elektrische Maschinen*)										
Bergvik & Ala Nya A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*)										
Billeruds A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse und Holz*)										
Bolidens Gruv A.-B. (*Gold, Kupfer etc.*)[7]										
Finspongs Metallverks A.-B. (*Metallwaren*)										
» » » » , freie[6]										
Ford Motor Company A.-B.										
Holmens Bruks- & Fabriks A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse, Woll- u. Baumwollwaren*) *Ser. A*										
Holmens Bruks- & Fabriks A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse, Woll- u. Baumwollwaren*) » *B*										
Höganäs-Billesholms A.-B. (*Kohlen, Feuerfester Ziegel und Tonwaren*)										
Kopparfors A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*)										
Korsnäs' Sågverks A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Holz*)										
Linoleum A.-B. Forshaga (*Linoleum*)										
Mexikanska Telefon A.-B. Ericsson (*Fernsprecherdienst*) *Ser. A*										
Mexikanska Telefon A.-B. Ericsson (*Fernsprecherdienst*) » *B*										
Mo och Domsjö A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*) *Ser. A*										
Mo och Domsjö A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*) » *B*										
Munksjö A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Holz*) *Ser. A*										
Munksjö A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Holz*) » *B*										
Munksjö A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Holz*) » *B, freie*[7]										
Sandvikens Jernverks A.-B. (*Eisen*)										
Skånska Cement A.-B. (*Zement*)										
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags A.-B. (*Eisen, Papier, Holzmasse und Holz*)										
Svenska Ackumulator A.-B. Jungner (*Akkumulatoren*) *Stam-Aktien A*										
Svenska Ackumulator A.-B. Jungner (*Akkumulatoren*) » *B*										
Svenska Ackumulator A.-B. Jungner (*Akkumulatoren*) » *B, gestempelt*[5]										
Svenska A.-B. Gasaccumulator (AGA) (*AGA-Licht etc.*) *Vorzugs-Aktien*										
Svenska Oljeslageri A.-B. (*Vegetabilische Öle etc.*)										
Svenska Sockerfabriks A.-B. (*Zucker*)										
Svenska Tändsticks A.-B. (*Zündhölzer*) *Ser. A*										
Svenska Tändsticks A.-B. (*Zündhölzer*) » *B*										
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (*Fernsprecher*) *Ser. A*										
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (*Fernsprecher*) » *B*										
Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund (*Eisenerz*)										
Uddeholms A.-B. (*Eisen, Holzmasse und Holz*)										
Wifstavarfs A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*)										
Eisenbahn- und Reederei-Aktien.										
A.-B. Svenska Amerika Linien (*Reederei*)										
Bergslagernas Järnvägs A.-B. (*Eisenbahn*)										
Stockholms Rederi A.-B. Svea (*Reederei*)										
Versicherungs- Aktien.										
Brand- och Liffförsäkrings-A.-B. Svea										
Försäkrings-A.-B. Skandia										
Bank-Aktien.										
A.-B. Göteborgs Bank *Vorzugs-Aktien*										
A.-B. Göteborgs Bank *Stamm-Aktien*										
» Svenska Handelsbanken										
Skandinaviska Kredit A.-B.										
Stockholms Enskilda Bank A.-B.										
Stockholms Intecknings Garanti A.-B.										
Sundsvalls Enskilda Bank A.-B.										
Södermanlands Enskilda Bank A.-B.										

[1] Refer to dividends paid for the preceding financial year. — *Bezieht sich auf Dividenden, die für das vorgehende Geschäftsjahr bezahlt worden sind.* — [2] Ex. dividend. — *Abzügl. Dividende.* — [3] Interim dividend. — *Vorschusszahlung.* — [4] Selling rate. — *Briefkurs.* — [5] Not aquirable by aliens. — *Nicht von Ausländern erwerblich.* — [6] Aquirable by aliens. — *Von Ausländern erwerblich.* — [7] Not quoted on the Stock Exchange. — *An der Börse nicht eingeführt.* — [8] Plus 1/5 bonus share. — *Zuzüglich 1/5 Gratis-Aktie.*

* Paid-up capital and reserves. — *Grundkapital und Reserven.*

SKANDINAVISKA KREDITAKTIEBOLAGET

STOCKHOLM, 16

MEMBER OF THE STOCKHOLM STOCK EXCHANGE

Offers complete facilities for the execution of stock exchange transactions, and undertakes the safe custody and handling of securities on behalf of customers

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Fernsprecher: Stockholm 0101

Telegrammadresse: Kreditbolaget

Stockholm 1938. Kgl. Boktr. P. A. Norstedt & Söner 382321

SKANDINAVISKA KREDITAKTIEBOLAGET

STATEMENT OF CONDITION MAY, 31st, 1938

Assets

Cash in hand		Kr. 148.865.429: 99
Bills:		
Swedish	Kr. 272.807.099: 62	
Foreign	» 14.466.206: 68	» 287.273.306: 30
Loans (secured)		» 343.156.683: 18
Current Accounts (secured)		» 82.085.969: 89
Swedish Banks		» 4.572.450: 28
Foreign Banks		» 29.244.119: 92
Sundry Accounts		» 23.356.005: 85
Bonds		» 61.931.262: 50
Shares		» 161.696.960: 94
Bank Buildings & Furniture		» 15.902.114: —
		Kr. 1.158.084.302: 85

Liabilities

Bills at sight in circulation (»postremiss» bills)		Kr. 14.047.412: 25
Deposits:		
at sight	Kr. 186.732.531: 19	
at notice	» 598.810.194: 46	» 785.542.725: 65
Swedish Banks		» 22.749.857: 97
Swedish Savings Banks		» 34.127.650: 59
Foreign Banks		» 36.401.243: 41
Sundry Accounts		» 53.215.412: 98
Registered Certificates of the Bank (»Förlagsbevis»):		
3½ % of 1937		» 50.000.000: —
Share Capital	Kr. 87.188.000: —	
Reserve Funds	» 74.812.000: —	» 162.000.000: —
		Kr. 1.158.084.302: 85


Inside the Circle:
Private Telephone Lines of the
Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget
Outside the Circle:
Direct Telephonic Connections with Foreign Countries
N. America
S. America
Africa
Australia
British India
Stockholm
Göteborg
Malmö